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THE CLOSING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES'
IRON CAGE
Michael L. Rustad*
I. INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages are portrayed as the unpredictable nine-
hundred-pound gorilla of our civil justice system ever ready to wreak
havoc on corporate America.' A recent insurance company report
entitled "Tort Excess 2004" asserts: "The possibility of a corporation
facing a costly, even bankrupting, lawsuit is greater than ever before
in the history of U.S. justice." 2 Another verbal grenade asserts "most
states set no limit on punitive damages for civil acts, yet punishment
for criminal acts is strictly limited.",3 The Solicitor General of the
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Boston. I wish to thank Dean Robert Smith of the Suffolk University Law
School for his support and encouragement of my scholarship. Reference
librarian, Diane D'Angelo, assisted me expertly, as did my research assistants
Patricia Emrich and Peter Nechtem. I am grateful for their help, and for the
materials I received from Professor Richard Wright of Chicago-Kent Law
School. I appreciate the helpful comments of Chryss J. Knowles on the
manuscript. I also wish to thank Richard Fleming, Brianna Fuller, and Glenn
Anaiscourt of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, who helped me
considerably.
1. See, e.g., Richard L. Blatt, ADR Can Help Fend Off Big Punitive
Awards.: Tools Such As Mediation Enable Cost-Effective Resolution Of Claims,
Bus. INS., Apr. 23, 2001, at 10, 2001 WL 5,101,243 ("Punitive damages can
wreak all kinds of havoc, from damaging corporate financial performance in
the short run, to threatening a company's very existence."); Warren Richey,
Court Weighs Limits on "Jackpot" Jury Awards, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 10, 2002, at 2, 2002 WL 6,429,664.
2. DAVID DIAL ET AL., TORT EXCESS 2004: THE NECESSITY FOR REFORM
FROM A POLICY, LEGAL AND RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 1
(2004), http://www.nasdaq.net/pbpubnisn/insurancearticles/tortreform_2004
0824.pdf.
3. Robert A. Levy, The Conservative Split on Punitive Damages.:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, CATO SUP.
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United States compared our system of punitive damages to a "giant
underground fungus."4 Much of what is asserted about the nature of
punitive damages is untrue, unknown, or stitched together from
questionable sources. "Politicians exchange tales... and stories of
the woman who won several million dollars from McDonald's after
spilling a cup of coffee on herself.",5 In the true-life McDonald's hot
coffee case, the plaintiff suffered napalm-like bums from a super-
heated beverage.
Because policy makers and even some judges understand so
little about the real world constraints on punitive damages, they
accept calls for tort reform based upon hyped-up anecdotes and
misleading statistics. True-sounding anecdotes do not make claims
about punitive damages true. "Few arguments are as powerful as a
populist-sounding cause backed by the corporate wallet."
7
There is a giant chasm between sound bites about demonized
punitive damages gone amuck and the actual patterning of awards.
Empirical studies unanimously conclude that high-end punitive
CT. REV. 159, 161 (2003), http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/docs/2003/
punitivedamages.pdf.
4. Theodore B. Olson, The Parasitic Destruction of America's Civil
Justice System, 47 SMU L. REV. 359, 359 (1994); see also Richey, supra note
1, at 2 (comparing the legal remedy of punitive damages to jackpot justice);
Stephen Chapman, Odor in the Court: The Great Lawsuit Lottery and How to
Close It Down, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 1995, at C3; The Product Liability
Fairness Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 565 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and
Transp., 104th Cong. 411-12 (1995) (statement of Theodore B. Olson, on
behalf of the Civil Justice Reform Group) (arguing that punitive damages are
irrationally awarded and spinning out of control).
5. Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in
Crisis? New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 317 (1999).
6. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That One
Coffee Spill Is Worth $ 2.9 Million, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Sept. 2, 1994, at 1,
1994 WL-WSJE 2,037,634. A New Mexico jury awarded 81-year old Stella
Liebeck $160,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive
damages after she suffered serious bums from coffee purchased from a drive-
through window at a McDonald's restaurant. Id. The trial judge later reduced
the punitive damages to $480,000, and the parties settled the case before an
appeal. Id. McDonald's not only served its coffee hotter than its competitors
but had more than 700 prior similar claims and yet made a conscious decision
not to warn customers of the possibility of serious bums. Id.
7. Marie Cocco, Bush Tortures Facts on 'Trial Lawyers', NEWSDAY, July
13, 2004, at A39, 2004 WL 84,870,651.
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damages are rarely awarded, are highly correlated with the plaintiff's
injury, are reserved for truly egregious circumstances, and are often
scaled back by trial and appellate judges.8 Juries are neither anti-
corporate nor extravagant in awarding punitive damages as compared
to judges.9 So effectively has tort reform rhetoric dominated the
punitive damages debate that the question of judicial control hardly
seems worth reexamining. This Article provides a new audit of the
judicial and legislative tort reforms constraining the remedy of
punitive damages.
Three major points will be discussed about tort reform. The first
is that there is significant variation among the states in the
availability of punitive damages. No common outlook is shared
because the remedy is flexible enough to respond to local social
problems. 10  The second point is that punitive damages are
8. "Every empirical study of punitive damages demonstrates that there is
no nationwide punitive damages crisis. The research shows that punitive
damages cluster in business tort and intentional tort cases, not personal injury.
The increase in punitive damages is largely confined to a few jurisdictions."
Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further
Inquiry, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 15, 69 [hereinafter Rustad, Unraveling Punitive
Damages] (summarizing the results of nine empirical studies of punitive
damages); see, e.g., Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, The Quiet
Revolution Revisited: An Empirical Examination of State Tort Reforms of
Punitive Damages, 16 JUST. SYs. J. 23 (1993); Michael Rustad, In Defense of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with
Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 50 (1992) [hereinafter Rustad, In Defense
of Punitive Damages] (reporting findings of a quarter century of punitive
damages in products liability litigation drawn from all U.S. jurisdictions);
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in
Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral
Monsters", 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1009 (1995) (reporting findings from
three decades of punitive damages awards in medical malpractice litigation
drawn from all U.S. jurisdictions).
9. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive
Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002); Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for
Reform, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 103, 158 (2002) (summarizing punitive damages
awards and concluding that jurors "take into account important characteristics
of the cases in making their punitive damage awards").
10. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems
and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 373-74 (1994) (explaining that "although
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constrained by far-reaching procedural safeguards at each stage of
the litigation process. The cards are increasingly stacked against
high-end punitive damages because of the triumph of tort reform.
Forty-five out of the fifty-one jurisdictions either do not recognize
punitive damages or have enacted one or more restrictions on the
remedy since 1979.11 These reforms include capping punitive
damages, bifurcating the amount of punitive damages from the rest
of the trial, raising the burden of proof, allocating a share of punitive
damages to the state, and restricting use of evidence of corporate
wealth. The handful of jurisdictions that have yet to enact tort
reforms are mostly punitive damages cold spots rather than tort
hellholes. 1 
2
most courts refer only to 'punishment' and 'deterrence' as rationales for
[punitive] damages, this masks the variety of specific functions that punitive
damages actually serve," including such additional functions as education,
compensation and law enforcement).
11. Of the jurisdictions that recognize punitive damages, only Delaware,
New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wyoming have not
enacted one or more of the following reforms: caps, proof, or split-recovery or
state-sharing of the punitive damages awards. See infra appendix A.
Delaware has enacted tort limitations on punitive damages in medical
malpractice cases that are inapplicable to other substantive fields. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (1999) (mandating bifurcated proceedings and a
statutorily prescribed standard of conduct for obtaining punitive damages
against health care professionals).
12. Five of the six states that have yet to enact judicial or legislative tort
reform of punitive damages are punitive damages cold-spots. Delaware, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wyoming are jurisdictions with a low
incidence of punitive damages. See Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages,
supra note 8, at 34-36. In a review of extant studies of punitive damages, I
found jurisdictional differences in the incidence of punitive damages. See id.
Texas and California are ranked first or second in each study. Id. Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and New York appeared in each of the top ten lists.
Id. North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma were the only jurisdictions
that ranked in the top ten in only one of the studies. Id. "The Department of
Justice study of 1992 verdicts in the nation's seventy-five most populous
counties found punitive damages to vary significantly by jurisdiction. Texas
ranked first in punitive damages with eighty-three, followed by California with
seventy. Georgia was third with sixteen awards, followed by New York (9),
Kentucky (8), Florida (7), Illinois (7), and Virginia (7)." Id. at 36. The clear
pattern is that punitive damages reforms were enacted in every punitive
damages hot spot save New York.
1300
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My third point is that when the state legislatures become
convinced that they have a punitive damages problem, they enact
substantive reforms or procedural restrictions on pleading, discovery,
evidence, jury instructions, and judicial control on the remedy to
prevent excessive awards. This Part examines the substantive limits
on the size of punitive damages as well as specialized punitive
damages defenses. A growing number of jurisdictions are capping
the level of punitive damages generally based upon a ratio or an
absolute dollar amount. In addition to state caps on damages, there is
a de facto cap on punitive damages in every jurisdiction imposed by
the U.S. Supreme Court's federal excessiveness framework. 13 The
story of the punitive damages recoil is a familiar one about special
legislation to help corporate America. 14
The state legislatures and courts have constructed a pro-
defendant iron cage15 that constrains punitive damages but does not
advance the performance of our civil justice system. The extensive
tort reform constitutes the bureaucratization of punitive damages.
Punitive damages are trending toward bureaucratic decision making,
away from decision making by juries. Judicial controls on punitive
damages undermine the institution of the jury and unduly constrain
this valuable remedy. 16 Punitive damages' iron cage makes it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prosecute and litigate punitive damages at
every stage of the litigation process.
13. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
14. Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Report of the Governor's
Commission on Tort and Liability Insurance Reform, 53 TENN L. REv. 679,
680 (1986) (quoting the dissent from Majority Report of the Governor's Task
Force on Tort Reform). This led the late Professor Jerry Phillips to argue that
tort reform proposals are "more of an evisceration than a reform of the
system." Id. at 680.
15. The metaphor of punitive damages' iron cage is inspired by German
sociologist Max Weber who used the figure of speech of the iron cage of
rationality to explain the seamy side of industrialized societies. See MAX
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 176-83
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
16. I am not arguing against the reform of punitive damages or any other
tort remedy but against special interest legislation benefiting powerful
stakeholders. See, e.g., John W. Wade, Strict Products Liability: A Look at its
Evolution, THE BRIEF, Fall 1989, at 8, 56 (arguing that tort reform should be
unconstitutional because of its classification as special interest legislation).
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The net effect of tort reforms has been to cabin and contain
punitive damages by marginalizing the role of the jury. The majority
of states cap or prohibit punitive damages altogether, which hampers
their deterrent function. Judge-assessed punitive damages in Kansas
and Connecticut eliminate jury discretion by replacing them with
judges.17  Pleading restrictions, evidentiary limitations, bifurcated
proceedings, fortified jury instructions, and strengthened post-verdict
review result in greater judicial control. The long-tail trend is for
states to strengthen judicial control at the expense of the jury
resulting in mechanical jurisprudence. The path of punitive damages
is leading away from citizen-jurors and toward bureaucrats. 18
The tort reformer's iron cage for punitive damages does
not genuinely reform the law, but confers special immunities and
limitations on corporate liability and accountability. The restrictions
on punitive damages are one-sided "reforms" benefiting corporate
defendants. These reforms make it more difficult to recover punitive
damages. Few of the reforms reported in Appendix A were a
product of careful policy-based or empirical studies. Hundreds of
tort limitations were placed on punitive damages despite clear and
convincing empirical research that there is no punitive damages
crisis warranting radical reforms. 19 Similarly, there is no empirical
evidence showing that juries are biased against corporate
defendants. State legislatures enacted these punitive damageslimitations as a backlash against a perceived litigation crisis, without
17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(a) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
240b (West 1999).
18. Kaimipono David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries,
2003 Wis. L. REV. 1115, 1115-16 (2003) ("Legal academics have bolstered the
theoretical and anecdotal case against punitive damages by enlisting empirical
evidence in their attack on juries. Professor Cass Sunstein has led this effort,
employing the methodology of behavioral economics to question juries'
abilities to award punitive damages rationally.... Sunstein and others suggest
that the problem is sufficiently severe that the power to award punitive
damages should be transferred from citizen-jurors to bureaucrats."); see also
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002).
19. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages, supra note 8, at 69.
20. In fact, Professor Valerie Hans concluded that jurors were predisposed
to be suspicious of the motives of plaintiffs bringing lawsuits against
corporations. See VALERIE HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 216 (2000).
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the benefit of careful empirical analysis. The downside of these
hastily enacted legislative reforms is that they result in unanticipated
negative consequences such as gender injustice.
2 1
Judge Richard Posner hypothesizes that state legislative
enactments are likely to have negative effects; judge-made rules tend
to increase efficiency whereas rules "made by legislatures tend to be
efficiency reducing." 22 Even so, in recent years, the vast majority of
states have enacted procedural reforms to reduce juror bias against
corporations in punitive damages litigation. The following
comparison of judicial and legislative reform in the states confirms
Posner's hypothesis and strongly suggests that the courts should be
left to do the work of "reforming" the tort system.
II: STATES AS LABORATORIES OF REFORM FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. State Tort Reforms of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are awarded to protect society from violations
of the public safety or order. There is no consensus upon a common
vocabulary for punitive damages or its social functions. Many
jurisdictions use the term "punitive damages," but other states use
the terms "exemplary damages," "vindictive damages," or "smart
money" to refer to punishment and deterrence2 3 through the common
law.24 The Oregon Supreme Court described punitive damages as a
21. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender
Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1995) (stating results of empirical
research on the impact of tort reform on gender-based injuries).
22. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 532 (2003).
23. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) ("Punitive
damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.").
24. See, e.g., Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Golway, 6 App. D.C. 143, 151
(1895) (ruling that "smart money" could not be assessed in cases involving
railway accident); Cowens v. Winter, 96 F. 929, 935 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he
doctrine is well settled that, in actions of tort, the jury... may award
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages, sometimes called 'smart
money' ....") (quoting Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S.
101, 107 (1893)). Colorado too follows the English convention of using the
term "exemplary damages" rather than punitive damages. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102 (2001). Alabama alternatively refers to punitive damages as
vindictive damages. ALA. CODE § 6-5-186 (1993). Before New Hampshire
abolished the remedy of punitive damages, it used the term "smart money."
Spring 2005] 1303
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"legal spanking" administered to bad actors who violate societal
norms.2 5 The remedy of punitive damages has many built-in judicial
controls to prevent abuses. The majority of states require plaintiffs
to prove that the defendant was malicious or at least recklessly
indifferent to the plaintiff. No jurisdiction permits punitive damages
to be awarded for mere negligence.
26
The states have historically had the complete freedom to
recognize the doctrine of punitive damages and determine the
procedural or substantive contours of the remedy.27 This Part of the
article examines the general availability of punitive damages in the
states. This brief sketch confirms that punitive damages are
prohibited in a minority of states and have a wide array of protected
defendant categories in the states that recognize punitive damages.
This Part confirms that punitive damages are a legal institution that
reflects state judgments as to which parties should have access to this
remedy.
B. Restrictions on the Availability of Punitive Damages
1. States that Prohibit Jury Awarded Punitive Damages
The vast majority of states recognize the common law doctrine
of punitive damages. Five states prohibit common law punitive
damages: Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and
Washington. Louisiana is a civil code jurisdiction that refused to
recognize punitive damages, except as statutorily authorized.29
Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 354 (Super. Ct. 1872).
25. Lane County v. Wood, 691 P.2d 473, 479 (Or. 1984).
26. Infra appendix A (documenting the verbal standard or punitive damages
predicate for all fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions).
27. See Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages, supra note 8, at 33-36.
28. "Louisiana, Nebraska, and Puerto Rico prohibit punitive damages
entirely; Massachusetts and Washington also ban punitive damages except
when specifically allowed by statute...." THOMAS F. LAMBERT JR., THE
CASE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A NEW AUDIT 2 (1988). Massachusetts does
not permit punitive damages unless specifically authorized by statute. Santana
v. Registrars of Voters, 502 N.E.2d 132 (Mass. 1986). Nebraska does not
allow punitive damages. Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb.
1975). Washington prohibits punitive damages unless authorized by statute.
Fisher Props., Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986).
29. Fairley v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 689 So. 2d 736 (La. Ct.
App. 1997).
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Massachusetts does not recognize punitive damages30 except as may be
recovered under specific statutory authorization such as the
Commonwealth's wrongful death statute that is penal in form, but
compensatory in effect. 31 Nebraska, too, refused to adopt the remedy
of punitive damages.32  Washington, like Massachusetts, permits
punitive damages only if specifically authorized by statute. 33 In
1986, New Hampshire became the first state to abolish punitive
damages by legislative decree.34 In Washington, punitive damages
are void as against public policy.35 As we shall see, a large number
of other states prohibit punitive damages against specific categories
of defendants.
36
2. Judge-Assessed Punitive Damages
Replacing the jury with judge-assessed punitive damages is a
radical tort reform designed to prevent excessive awards. In
Connecticut 37 and Kansas, 38 the jury determines whether punitive
damages should be awarded, but the judge sets the amount of
damages.39 Ohio had such a statute, but it was repealed.4 ° Judge-
30. O'Reilly v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940).
31. Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1 (Mass. 1891).
32. Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684 (Neb. 1960).
33. Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988);
Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 898 P.2d 284, 290 (Wash. 2004)
(refusing to recognize common law punitive damages); Santana v. Registrars
of Voters, 502 N.E.2d 132, 135 (Mass. 1986).
34. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §507:16 (1997) (reporting legislative change
effective July 1, 1986).
35. Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 436 P.2d 186 (Wash. 1968).
36. For example, Illinois prohibits punitive damages in medical malpractice
actions. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (West 2003). Oregon limits
actions against product manufacturers, OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (2003), and
prohibits punitive damages awards against medical providers, id. § 30.927.
37. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1999).
38. "In any civil action in which exemplary or punitive damages are
recoverable, the trier of fact shall determine, concurrent with all other issues
presented, whether such damages shall be allowed. If such damages are
allowed, a separate proceeding shall be conducted by the court to determine the
amount of such damages to be awarded." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(a)
(1994).
39. See also Malcolm Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming
Punitive Damage Procedures 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 302 (1983) ("Several efforts
have been made to place the responsibility for deciding the size of a punitive
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assessed punitive damages resemble criminal trials in which a trial is
bifurcated into the determination of guilt or innocence phase and the
sentencing phase.4' Judges set sentences considering a wider range
of aggravating and mitigating factors only after guilt or innocence
has been determined.42 Academic commentators are deeply divided
about whether juries should have the right to determine the amount
of punitive damages.
43
3. Immunity for Specific Defendant Categories
a. Public entities
Most states prohibit the awarding of punitive damages against
public entities.44 The typical state tort claims act does not permit the
recovery of punitive damages and places a statutory cap on the
damages award on the court and not on the jury."); David Owen, Punitive
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1320 (1976)
("The best protection against excessive punitive damages awards would
probably be to shift the responsibility for their measurement from the jury to
the trial judge once the jury has determined that such damages should be
assessed.").
40. SB 108 (149 v -) § 3(A)(8), 124th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2001),
reprinted in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 app. (Anderson 2001).
41. Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for
Jury Assessed Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American
Jury, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 411 n.328 (2002).
42. Id.
43. Professor Lisa Litwiller argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has not
only changed the standard of review in excessiveness reviews for punitive
damages, but also sounded the "death knell" on the jury's right to assess
punitive damages. Id. at 411 (arguing that Cooper Industries Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. ruled that "the level of punitive damages is not
really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury"); see also Ryan Fowler, Why Punitive
Damages Should Be a Jury's Decision in Kansas: A Historical Perspective, 52
KAN. L. REv. 631 (2004) (arguing that judge-assessed punitive damages
"defly] the historical purposes for both the civil jury and punitive damages,
[are] an inappropriate means to the purported ends of curing the insurance
crisis, and ha[ve] further eroded society's ability to control and keep in check
potentially harmful and powerful entities").
44. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-13-3-4(b) (Michie Supp. 2004) (stating
that there is no punitive damages against state officers or entities); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 23A, § IA (2001) (stating that municipal corporations and their
officers are not liable for punitive damages).
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amount of the award.45  Florida, for example, prohibits awards
against the state government or its employees. 46 Most courts refuse
to impose punitive damages against municipalities for the wrongful
acts of employees or agents.47 Municipalities are not liable for
punitive damages in Maryland. Further, in most states, a municipality
"may not indemnify a law enforcement officer for... punitive
damages if the law enforcement officer has been found guilty.
48
Punitive damages may not be assessed against any Alabama state
agency.
49
Punitive damages in Illinois are not recoverable against
municipalities and governmental employees acting in their official
capacities. 50  Similarly, the federal government has refused to
surrender sovereign immunity for punitive damages, and in addition,
this remedy is not available in lawsuits against the federal
government. 51  Illinois precludes the possibility of recovery for
punitive damages against public entities and officials serving in their
official capacities.
52
b. Wrongful death defendants
The purpose of wrongful death laws is to allow an injured
person's action and claim for damages to survive. Alabama is the
only state to permit punitive damages but not compensatory damages
45. See, e.g., South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to 15-78-200
(Law Co-op Supp. 2003). See id. § 15-78-120 (stating limitation on liability;
prohibition against recovery of punitive or exemplary damages or prejudgment
interest; signature of attorney on pleadings, motions, or other papers); cf
Providence Wash. Ins. Co. of Alaska v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863
(Alaska 1984) (holding that punitive damages assessed against a municipal
corporation were insurable).
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West Supp. 2004).
47. 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
194 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that "most courts... refused to make punitive
damages for wrongful acts of agents and employees against public entities"
because the cost is imposed on citizens).
48. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303 (Supp. 2004).
49. ALA. CODE § 6-11-26 (1993).
50. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-102 (West 2002); see, e.g., Strandell v.
Jackson County, 648 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Ill. 1986).
51. 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 47, at 194.
52. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/2-102.
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in wrongful death cases. 53  Massachusetts does permit wrongful
death punitive damages, but does not recognize the common law
remedy. The vast majority of states do not permit punitive
damages to be awarded in wrongful death actions. 55 Most states
prohibiting punitive damages in wrongful death cases do so because
their respective statutes are designed to be compensatory.
56
c. Complicity rule for corporate punitive liability
Many states do not recognize vicarious liability or the doctrine
of respondeat superior when it comes to punitive damages57 but
rather use the complicity rule that requires greater proof of corporate
involvement.5 8 Under the complicity rule, the principal is not liable
53. Killough v. Jahandarfard, 578 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Ala. 1991).
54. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 2000); Peerless Ins. Co. v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 723 N.E.2d 996, 999 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (noting
wrongful death statute is exclusive remedy for damages).
55. See, e.g., California: Vander Lind v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 209,
215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Colorado: Mangus v. Miller, 535 P.2d 219, 221 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1975); DeCicco v. Trinidad Area Health Assoc., 573 P.2d 559 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that punitive damages were precluded in the death of victim
of an accident); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3704 (1999) (punitive
damages are available for the decedent's pain and suffering before death under
Delaware's survival statute); Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 263,
269-70 (D. Del. 1990) (recovery for punitive damages may be had for survival
actions, but punitive damages are not available under Delaware's wrongful death
action); Reynolds v. Willis, 209 A.2d 760, 763 (Del. 1965); Georgia: Roescher v.
Lehigh Acres Development, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 154, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972);
Hawaii: Greene v. Texeira, 505 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Haw. 1973); North Dakota:
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-21-02 (Michie 1996); Wisconsin: Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 464-65 (Wis. 1980).
56. See, e.g., Vander Lind, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (discussing legislative
history of California wrongful death statute demonstrates statute designed to
provide for compensatory damages only).
57. 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 47, at 183-84.
58. The "complicity rule" was coined in an article by Clarence Morris,
Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. LJ. 216, 221 (1960).
Professor Morris' complicity rule requires that the plaintiff prove some
deliberate corporate participation before corporate punitive liability may be
imposed. Id. Generally, a high-level officer of the corporation must have
ordered, participated in, or ratified the egregious conduct of the employee for
the firm to be assessed punitive damages. Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217C (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979); see,
e.g., Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc. v. Bellegarde, 958 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Nev.
1998) (adopting Section 909 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS).
1308
Spring 2005] PUNITIVE DAMAGES' IRON CA GE 1309
for punitive damages for the agent's act unless the conduct was
authorized or ratified.59 Companies are only answerable for punitive
damages if there is proof that "the conduct giving rise to the punitive
damages claim is committed by a primary owner, officer, or an
employee acting in the capacity of a "'managing agent. ''60  The
corporate complicity rule was approved by Illinois in McCarthy v.
Paine Webber. Inc. ,61 where the court stated explicitly: "Illinois law is
clear that respondeat superior principles alone will not justify an award
of punitive damages against an employer."
62
In the Second Circuit case of Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc.,63 Judge Friendly applied New York law to support the proposition
that "superior officers" must order, participate in, or ratify outrageous
misconduct in order to hold a corporate master liable for punitive
damages. In that case, the court stated that punitive damages may not
be imposed upon a corporation "unless, as charged [by the court] the
officers or directors, that is, the management of the company or the
relevant division 'either authorized, participated in, consented to or,
after discovery, ratified the conduct giving rise to such damages."'
64
Punitive damages against employers for their agents' misconduct serve
a deterrent function for the employees. 65  The trend toward the
complicity rule makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove punitive
damages against corporations and other entities.
d. No punitive damages in selected cases
i. Breach of contract
Punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract.
The Uniform Commercial Code does not expressly provide for
punitive damages in any of its nine articles.6 6 Punitive damages are
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(d) (1994).
60. Robert A. Santa Lucia, Punitive Damages: Overview and Update, FLA.
BAR. J., April 1995, at 40.
61. 618 F. Supp. 933 (D. 11. 1985).
62. Id. at 942.
63. 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying New York Law).
64. Id.
65. Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv.
1173, 1202-03 (1931).
66. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-106 (2002) (amended 2003) ("neither
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not available in contract or commercial law cases absent proof of an
independent tort.67 Some jurisdictions prohibit punitive damages for
breach of contract even where there is proof of malice.68 The limited
availability of punitive damages in contract or commercial cases has
largely been a common law development rather than a legislative tort
reform.
ii. Professional negligence cases
Several states have rejected punitive damages claims in
professional negligence cases. For example, Illinois precludes
punitive damages in legal and medical malpractice cases.69 This
prohibition against punitive damages in malpractice actions was upheld
against equal protection and due process challenges in Bernier v.
Burris.
70
Similarly, in Lund v. Kokemoor, a Wisconsin appellate court held
that punitive damages are not recoverable in medical malpractice
actions. 7 1 The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the statutory
language, "other economic injuries and damages," was sufficiently
broad to encompass punitive damages. 72 The same is true in Oregon.
Punitive damages may not be recovered against medical
practitioners.73  States that prohibit punitive damages against
professionals have, in effect, created a pocket of immunity that
reduces the scope of liability protection.
consequential or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically
provided in this Act or by other rule of law"); U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2003)
("neither consequential or special damages nor penal damages may be had
except as specifically provided...").
67. 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 47, at 390 ("A majority of
jurisdictions allow punitive damages for breach of contract that constitutes an
independent tort.").
68. See, e.g., Sere Inc. v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
69. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115 (West 2003) (prohibiting punitive
damages in medical and legal malpractice cases); Calhoun v. Rane, 599 N.E.2d
1318, 1321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
70. 497 N.E.2d 763 (111. 1986).
71. 537 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
72. Id.
73. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.740 (2003); RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE To LAW AND PRACTICE 472 (4th ed.
2000).
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III. TORT REFORMS INCREASING JUDICIAL CONTROL
Since 1979, there has been a systematic tort reform backlash
against punitive damages in all but a few states.74 In 2001, Florida,
Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, and West Virginia enacted
additional tort limitations. 75 Since 2003, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Mississippi, and Texas have instituted new limitations on
the remedy of punitive damages.76 Prior to 2003, North Carolina
passed a cap on punitive damages.77 Its stated goal was to preserve
the state's economic development, "given the impact of punitive
damages on a variety of industries; to assure public confidence in the
judicial system; and to provide clear notice of possible penalty to
defendants, whose property, as the result of a punitive damages
award, will potentially be taken as a punishment." 78 North Carolina
enacted these limitations despite empirical evidence of the
jurisdiction being in the punitive damages arctic.
79
In 2004, Mississippi became the latest state to cap punitive
damages. For any trial taking place on or after September 1, 2004,
punitive damages are capped on a sliding scale calibrated to the net
worth of the defendant.80 The maximum amount any defendant can
pay is $20 million, regardless of assets.
81
Despite a record of twenty-five years of tort reform in
74. See generally AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, TORT REFORM
RECORD, http://www.atra.org/files.cgi/7802_Record6-04.pdf (last visited Aug.
1,2005).
75. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster:
The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 65 (2001).
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (Michie Supp. 2003); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(3) (Michie 2004); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 2004); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2003); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003
(Supp. 2004-2005).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (2003).
78. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp, 594 S.E.2d 1, 16 (N.C. 2004).
79. Michael Ballance, Tilting at Windmills, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC.,
Sept. 3, 1995, at F3, 1995 WL 9,442,792 (stating that "[plunitive damages are
notoriously rare in North Carolina").
80. Mississippi Governor to Get Tort-Reform Bill Legislators Stayed Late
to Finish, BEST WIRE, June 4, 2004, 2004 WL 61,250,440; MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 11-1-65 (Supp. 2004).
81. MISS CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(3)(a) (Supp. 2004).
Spring 2005] 1311
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1297
practically every state, no state has thoroughly studied the impact of
these reforms on our civil justice system. 82  Tort reformers use
haphazard horror stories to induce state legislatures to take steps to
rein in the "largely illusory problem of overly-generous punitive
damages."
83
Appendix A presents a new methodical audit of a fifty-one
jurisdiction appraisal of tort limitations on punitive damages enacted
over the past quarter century. The irresistible conclusion anyone can
draw is that there has been a dramatic legislative backlash against
punitive damages in all but a few states. 84 I use the term, "quiet
revolution" to refer to the relative lack of publicity about the iron
cage closing around punitive damages. Journalists do not report
about tort limitations with the same gusto as they do fugitive juries.
85
Little civic education is dedicated to tort reform. No state permits
the jury to be educated about tort reform limitations. State
legislatures and courts have a gag order that prevents them from
enlightening the jury about whether a given jurisdiction caps or
places other limitations on punitive damages. North Carolina, for
example, prohibits references to tort reforms in the voir dire,
arguments, jury instructions, or otherwise. 86  The jury is neither
informed nor educated about tort limitations imposed by trial judges
82. Robbennolt, supra note 9, at 159 (concluding that little by way of
empirical research has been conducted on the impact of tort reform).
83. Id.
84. The quiet revolution in punitive damages occurred during the same
period in which plaintiffs were less successful in products litigation. See
generally Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet
Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 741 (1992) (reporting
that the success rates of plaintiffs in products liability litigation as documented
in published opinions "fell from 56% in 1979 to 39% in 1989, a drop of 29%").
85. Bill O'Reilly of Fox News, for example, purports to "look after the
folks" but has not covered this topic. See BillOReilly.com (containing
numerous references to the need for tort reform, but no acknowledgment of
limitations already in place). The same journalists that cover lawsuit abuse do
not acknowledge that there are tort reforms.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(c) (2003); see also ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(g)
(Supp. 2003) ("The jury may neither be instructed nor informed as to the
provisions of this section" [cap on punitive damages]); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1604(3) (Michie 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3.3 (Michie 1998); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.73(8) (West 1997).
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after the jury verdict is returned.
A. Restrictions on Punitive Damages Pleading
1. Pleading of Punitive Damages
In many jurisdictions, plaintiffs cannot claim punitive damages
in the initial complaint. Illinois, for example, permits plaintiffs to
amend a complaint after a pretrial motion and hearing before the
court. 87 Any motion to amend the complaint to contain punitive
damages must be made within thirty days after the close of
discovery.88 California requires court permission before a plaintiff
may claim punitive damages against a religious corporation 89 as well
as in medical malpractice litigation. 90  Florida has pleading
restrictions in medical negligence cases. 91 In medical malpractice
cases, the attorney must make a reasonable investigation and verify
the same before filing a complaint seeking punitive damages. 92 If a
court rules that a certificate of counsel was not made in good faith,
the judge may award attorney's fees and costs against the claimant's
counsel.93 No discovery of corporate financial worth may proceed
until after the pleading for punitive damages is permitted in all
substantive fields.
94
Pleading reforms, in general, bring common sense to the
common law by screening out questionable punitive damages claims
at an early stage of litigation. The restrictions on pleading are
designed to protect corporate defendants from nuisance punitive
damages claims and eliminate these claims at an early stage of the
litigation. Pleading restrictions screen out marginal claims and
87. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604.1 (West 2003) (struck down in Best
v. Taylor Machine as part of an unconstitutional scheme); see infra note 518 on
the continuing validity of this provision after Best.
88. Id.
89. WILLIAM F. FLAHAVAN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
PERSONAL INJURY § 3:255.7 (2004 ed.).
90. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.13 (West 2004) (stating that punitive
damages may not be pleaded in the initial complaint in medical malpractice cases
and can only be added by leave of the court).
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West Supp. 2004).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. § 768.72 (describing punitive damages pleading).
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prevent extortionate claims.
2. Prohibition of Ad Damnum Clauses
Publicizing large amounts sought in lawsuits creates an
impending problem of confusing the public about the size and
frequency of awards. The preliminary announcement as to the
amount of damages claimed is what is referred to as the ad damnum
clause. 95 The policy rationale for eliminating ad damnum clauses is
to steer clear of the premature appraisal of a punitive damages claim
by the jury and to prevent inflationary punitive damages awards.
96
Ad damnum clauses were first abolished in medical injury
cases 97 beginning in the early 1980s. Florida eliminated ad damnum
clauses, so the plaintiff was no longer permitted to declare the
amount of damages claimed,98 as did the state of New York in
medical malpractice cases.99 In November of 2003, New York
eliminated ad damnum clauses in all civil actions.' 00 No systematic
empirical research has evaluated the impact of tort reforms
restricting or eliminating ad damnum clauses. Intuitively, however,
this tort reform has the positive impact of addressing the problem of
undue pretrial publicity on multi-million dollar claims that prove
meritless.
B. Prohibitions on Mentioning Punitive Damages
An increasing number of states restrict plaintiffs counsel from
95. See, e.g., Illinois C.R. Co. v. Heath, 81 N.E. 1022, 1024 (I11. 1907)
(stating that an instruction as to the elements of damages and the size of a fair
compensation, was referred to as the ad damnum declaration).
96. See Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels:
Proposed Model Legislation To Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
181, 246, n.353 (1990) (noting that elimination of ad damnum clauses removes
plaintiffs' incentive to falsely inflate punitive damages and potentially mislead
juries).
97. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:6 (1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2901 (West 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 13B (West 2000).
98. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West Supp. 2004); T. R. Ted Castle and
M.A. Dewar, Medical Malpractice: A New Treatment for an Old Illness, 16
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 537, 539 (1988).
99. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3017(c) (McKinney 1991).
100. Id.; Joel Stashenko, Pataki Signs Bill Eliminating Damage Amounts in
Liability Suits, AP/NEWSDAY, Oct. 31, 2003, http://www.overlawyered.com/
archives/000473.html.
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making rabble-rousing arguments about punitive damages. In fact,
courts will generally not allow any mention of punitive damages
until counsel has proven aprimafacie case.' 0' A few courts curb the
plaintiff's counsel's arguments about punitive damages during
opening and closing statements. 10 2 The goal of these tort reforms is
to reduce juror bias against defendants where there is an insufficient
foundation for punitive damages. Even those states have not gone so
far as to prohibit arguments about punitive damages per se, and give
the trial judge wide discretion to limit arguments about punitive
damages at each stage of the trial.0 3
C. Restrictions on Evidence for Punitive Damages
Trial judges have historically enjoyed wide discretion in
admissibility decisions on the issue of punitive damages. Evidence
is broadly defined as "any matter of fact which is furnished to a legal
tribunal, otherwise than by reasoning, [or a reference to what is
noticed without proof], as the basis of inference in ascertaining some
other matter of fact."' 4 A number of states bar the admission of
evidence material to punitive damages but irrelevant to the issue of
compensatory damages. 10 5 The trend has been for courts to adopt
greater evidentiary limitations in punitive damages litigation.
1. Admissibility of Corporate Wealth
Wealth-sensitive punitive damages can teach even the most
powerful corporation that anti-social conduct does not pay. For more
than two hundred years, the wealth of the defendant was considered a
relevant basis for setting the amount of punitive damages. 10 6 The
101. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.85(4)(a) (West Supp. 2004).
102. See, e.g., Vanskike v. ACF Indus., Inc., 665 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1981)
(applying Missouri law and reversing the district court's decision overruling
the motion for a mistrial based on the inflammatory closing argument
concerning punitive damages).
103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(i) (Supp. 2003); ALASKA STAT.
§ 9.17.020(d) (Michie Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211(a)(2)
(Michie Supp. 2003).
104. Ezra Thayer, Presumptions and the Law of Evidence, 3 HARV. L. REv.
142, 143 (1889).
105. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-21 l(b) (Michie Supp. 2003).
106. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendant's Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 413 (1991) (analyzing relevance of wealth to punitive damages'
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purpose of introducing evidence of wealth is to calibrate the amount
of punitive damages to achieve the most efficient level of
deterrence. 107 For these reasons, most states permit the admissibility
of the financial condition or wealth of the defendant to set
punishment. 1
08
A growing number of states have adopted tort reforms limiting
deterrent effect). The Court in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), sets forth factors that may legitimately be
considered in determining whether a given punitive award is "reasonable." See
id. at 457-60, 462. The TXO factors were: the wealth of the defendant;
"potential harm" of the defendant's course of conduct; the degree of bad faith
displayed by the defendant; and whether the conduct was part of a "larger
pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit." Id. at 459-62 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
107. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 n.28
(1993) (stating that the admissibility of wealth in determining the size of
punitive damages is "well-settled law"); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33 (7th Cir.
1996) (noting that the majority of jurisdictions permit, but do not require,
wealth to be considered in assessing damages).
108. See, e.g., Alabama: Wealth is admissible in the second phase of the
bifurcated proceedings in non-wrongful death actions. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v.
Johnson, 1995 WL 683,857 (Ala. Nov. 17, 1995) but inadmissible in wrongful
death actions, Gen. Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176 (Ala. 1985);
Alaska: Alaska Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945 (Alaska 1986); Clary Ins.
Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194, 205 (Alaska 1984) (wealth may be considered in
determining the size of punitive damages); Delaware: Strauss v. Biggs, 525 A.2d
992, 1000 (Del. 1987); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 527 (Del. 1987);
Bryan v Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d 107 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982); Wiener v.
Markel, 92 A.2d 706 (Del. Super. Ct. 1952) (wealth may be considered); Hawaii:
Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Haw. 1989); Vollert v.
Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Haw. 1975) (applying Hawaii
law); Idaho: Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767, 772 (9th Cir.
1984) (applying Idaho law); Dwyer v Libert, 167 P. 651 (Idaho 1917); Illinois:
Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 427 N.E.2d 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Kansas:
Tetuan v. A.H. Robins, 738 P.2d 1210, 1238-39 (Kan. 1987); Henderson v.
Hassur, 594 P.2d 650, 665 (Kan. 1979) (ruling that wealth is admissible); Maine:
Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178, 1180-81 (Me. 1991); Sander v. Van Pelt, 497
A.2d 1121, 1127 (Me. 1985) (wealth is admissible but not required);
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (2002); Thorne v.
Contee, 565 A.2d 102, 111 (Md. 1989) (stating that Maryland does not admit
information as to the defendant's financial condition into evidence, until punitive
damages liability has been proved); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-
03.2-11(3) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003) ("Evidence of a defendant's financial
condition or net worth is not admissible in the proceeding on exemplary
damages.").
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the use of a defendant's wealth or financial condition in setting the
amount of punitive damages.' 0 9 Iowa's tort reform statute does not
permit the discovery of the wealth of the defendant until the plaintiff
proves there is "sufficient admissible evidence" for punitive
damages." 0 Some courts restrict access to the parent corporation's
wealth if a subsidiary is charged with punitive damages, as in
Gearhart v. Uniden Corp. ofAmerica. I II
Some jurisdictions do not permit the admission of evidence of
the defendant's wealth until a supportable case for punitive damages
is proven. 112 Utah, for example, permits the admission of evidence
of a party's wealth or financial condition only after a finding of
liability for punitive damages has been made. 11. An Oregon statute
provides that: "[d]uring the course of trial, evidence of the
defendant's ability to pay shall not be admitted unless and until the
party entitled to recover establishes aprimafacie right to recover." 
11 4
Arkansas, for example, does not permit proof of a defendant's
financial condition until after the plaintiff makes out a case for
109. See, e.g., Alabama: So. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Whitman, 358 So. 2d
1025, 1026-27 (Ala. 1978); California: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West
1997); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (2002) ("In
any action for punitive damages for personal injury, evidence of the defendant's
financial means is not admissible until there has been a finding of liability and
that punitive damages are supportable under the facts."); Montana: MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (2003); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005(4) (Michie
2002); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(3) (Supp. 2003);
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(2) (2003); Tennessee: Hodges v. S.C. Toof
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992); and Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
18-1(2) (Supp. 2004).
110. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(3) (West 1998).
111. 781 F.2d 147, 153 (8th Cir. 1986).
112. A minority of states restrict evidence of a defendant's wealth until the
jury determines punitive liability: Alabama: So. Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Whitman, 358 So.2d 1025, 1026-27 (Ala. 1978); California: CAL. CIV. CODE §
3295(d) (West 1997); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-
913(a) (2002); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (2003); Nevada:
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005(4) (Michie 2002); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §
30.925(2) (2003); Tennessee: Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896,
901 (Tenn. 1992); and Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (2002 & Supp.
2004).
113. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (Supp. 2004).
114. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(2) (2003).
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punitive damages.1 5 Wisconsin does not permit counsel to introduce
evidence of the defendant's wealth until a prima facie case is
established.11 6 Maryland does not admit evidence of the defendant's
financial means until there has been a finding of punitive damages
"supportable under the facts." 17 The growing consensus is that the
evidence of corporate wealth is not admissible until after the trial
judge makes a determination that punitive damages are at issue.118
The law-making activity of judges and legislatures concerning
corporate wealth makes it less likely that the jury will be awarding
punitive damages based upon a "deep pocket" rather than evidence
of corporate culpability. A few states even require the fact finder to
consider wealth when setting the amount of punitive damages.
California requires evidence of the defendant's financial condition as
critical to the punitive damages formulation, but such evidence is
inadmissible in wrongful death actions.1 19 Ohio's tort reform statute
for punitive damages requires the factfinder to consider the wealth of
the defendant in cases involving nursing home or residential
facilities. 1
20
Despite this, the trend of tort reform has been to strike wealth
from punitive damages and instead cap damages at a number that de-
individualizes punishment, generally at the greater of a fixed sum or
some multiple of the compensatory damages. For example, North
Dakota's 1995 tort reform prohibits the use of corporate wealth or
personal financial worth in the punitive damages portion of a trial.121
Such caps, however, "artificially and arbitrarily deflate punitive
damages, no matter how egregious the defendant's disregard of
health and safety."' 22 The arbitrary limitation of punitive damages to
the harm suffered by the plaintiff "undermines deterrence because
115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211 (b) (Michie Supp. 2003).
116. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.85(4) (West 1997).
117. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (2002).
118. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (West Supp. 2004).
119. Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991) (ruling that evidence
of defendant's financial condition is required in setting punitive damages).
120. 2004 Ohio Laws 144 (effective Apr. 7,2005).
121. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(3) (Michie 1996 &
Supp. 2003).
122. Prod. Liab. Reform Act of 1997: Hearing before the S. Comm. On
Commerce, Sci., and Trans., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Lucinda M.
Finley, Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo Law School).
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the sanction is then limited to a predictable amount of money."'
123
Tort reformers seek to decouple corporate wealth from the
punitive damages equation. They seek a system of punitive
sanctions that treats everyone equally: the punitive damages paid by
a drunk driver should be the same as those paid by a Fortune 500
company. 124  Yet wealth is taken into consideration for elderly
recipients of Social Security who are taxed on their benefits if their
income exceeds a certain amount. 125 Upper middle class families
whose income exceeds a given level may be denied or have restricted
access to governmentally-funded student aid programs. 126  A
government regulation that takes into account how much money one
earns does not mean that an entity or individual has been denied due
process or been treated unequally before the law. 1
2 7
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently stepped into the mix,
saying, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,128 that wealth alone could not justify a high-ratio punitive
damages award. 12 9  The Court has repeatedly expressed concern
about the open-ended use of wealth-based punishment.'
30
123. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts " as Corporate Just
Deserts, 31 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 289, 324-25 (1998).
124. See Note, Common Sense Litigation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort
Reform, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1772 (1996).
125. 26 U.S.C. § 86 (2000); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or
Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation
of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221,226 n.22 (1995).
126. See, e.g., Children-Indiana Head Start Program Eligibility
Requirements for 2002-2003, at http://www.in.gov/fssa/children/headstart/
eligibility.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
127. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991)
(consideration of defendant's wealth did not violate due process).
128. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
129. Id. at 427 ("While States enjoy considerable discretion in deducing
when punitive damages are warranted, each award must comport with the
principles set forth in Gore. Here the argument that [the defendant] will be
punished in only the rare case, coupled with reference to its assets (which, of
course, are what other insured parties in Utah and other States must rely upon
for payment of claims) had little to do with the actual harm sustained by the
[plaintiffs]. The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damages award.").
130. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 585 ("The fact that
BMW is a large corporation rather than an impecunious individual does not
diminish its entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several States
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Wealth-sensitive punitive damages serve a deterrent function
because that level of award that would punish an impoverished
person would not 'sting' a wealthy person or company. 131
D. Delayed Discovery of Corporate Wealth or
Financial Evidence
A larger number of states place restrictions on the admissibility
of evidence of corporate wealth in punitive damages litigation. In
general, all states permit the discovery of evidence that appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the admissibility of evidence on the
issue of punitive damages.' 32  In Rochen v. Huang,133 the court
observed that a jury could "potentially [be] affected by the disparate
financial positions of the parties [and was] concerned that the
admission of financial information relevant only to establish the
impose on the conduct of its business.").
131. Wealth-based punitive damages are optimally used to punish and deter
wrongdoers where the probability of detection is very low and the probability
of harm is very high. Law and economics scholars contend that the price of
wrongdoing must be proportional to potential gain in order to have a deterrent
effect. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 160-63 (1987); see also Symposium Discussion:
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 187-88 (1982) (comments of
Edward Dauer). In Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257 (1989), a national waste disposal firm attempted to gain a competitive
edge over a smaller rival by "[s]quish[ing] him like a bug." Id. at 260. The
jury's six million dollar punitive damages award was designed not only to
punish the defendant, but also to deter the business community from
employing such tactics. See id. at 275 (noting that "punitive damages advance
the interests of punishment and deterrence"). A six million dollar punitive
damages award will sting, but not bankrupt a national waste disposal company.
The $10 million punitive damages award affirmed by the Supreme Court in
TXO Products Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), was
based upon the actual and potential harm of the defendant's course of conduct,
the degree of bad faith displayed by the defendant, and whether the conduct
was part of a "larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit." Id. at 462. The ten
million dollar punitive award sent a specific deterrent message to TXO, and a
general message of deterrence to the entire oil and gas industry not to engage
in predatory business practices. Id. at 453.
132. See 4 JEROME H. NOTES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 40.07[2]
(2002) for a summary of the various states rules on punitive damages.
133. No. 87C-JN-961, 1989 Del. Super. LEXIS 18 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 6,
1989).
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amount of punitive damages could well prejudice [the] defendant's
ability to receive fair consideration on the liability issues." 134 It is
common for states to place restrictions on the discovery of corporate
profits or the financial condition of the defendant by requiring an
order of the court. 
135
Some states give the trial judge the discretion to place
restrictions on the discovery of evidence relevant to the wealth of a
defendant. 136 The court in Varriale v. Saratoga Harness Racing,
Inc.' 37 stated that discovery of wealth of a defendant is not permitted
until a factfinder determines first that the plaintiff is entitled to
punitive damages. In Moran v. International Playtex, Inc.,138 a
plaintiff moved for examination before trial of the defendant
manufacturer's financial records. The New York court found that
discovery could only begin after the jury found the plaintiff was
entitled to punitive damages. 139 Florida does not permit a plaintiff to
discover a company's net worth until the court has issued an order
permitting an amended complaint for punitive damages. 140
E. Bifurcating Punitive Damages
Bifurcated or trifurcated l4 1 trials require a separate proceeding to
"receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision regarding what
amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the
134. Id. at *4.
135. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 3295 (West 1997).
136. See, e.g., Alabama: Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 589 So. 2d 684,
686 (Ala. 1991) (stating that the evidence of financial condition of defendant is
inadmissible during liability phase of trial); Colorado: Leidholt v. Dist. Court,
619 P.2d 768, 771 (Colo. 1980) (requiring prima facie showing of punitive
damages before wealth of the defendant may be discovered); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.72 (West Supp. 2004) (stating that there is no discovery of wealth until
punitive damages are permitted by the trial judge).
137. 429 N.Y.S.2d 302 (App. Div. 1980).
138. 480 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1984).
139. Id. at 8.
140. Meadowbrook Health Care Servs. of Fla. v. Acosta, 617 So. 2d 1104,
1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
141. Trifurcated proceedings divide a trial into three phases: (1) the
determination of compensatory damages; (2) determining whether the evidence
warrants punitive damages; and (3) determination of the amount of punitive
damages. See Cuzzort v. City of Gretna, No. 98-3096, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
621, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2000).
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defendant in light of the circumstances of the case."'142 Evidence of the
defendant's wealth and other aggravating circumstances are cabined
off from the compensatory phase to protect the defendant. States
differ with respect to what is bifurcated. There are two general types
of punitive damages bifurcation: bifurcation of the entire punitive
damages claim, and bifurcation only with respect to the amount of
punitive damages. A few states permit a bifurcation of the entire
punitive issue-punitive liability as well as the amount of
damages-from the compensatory damages stage. 1
43
A larger number of states reconvene the second stage of the trial
to permit the jury to receive evidence of the defendant's wealth to set
the amount of the award. 144 During the punitive stage of the trial, the
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d) (West 2003) provides that: "[iln any case
in which punitive damages are claimed, the trier of fact shall first resolve from the
evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made."
If it is found that punitive damages are to be awarded, "the trial shall immediately
be recommenced in order to receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision
regarding what amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish
the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case. It shall then be the duty of
the trier of fact to set the amount to be awarded .... " Id. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1).
143. These states include Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-211 (Michie
Supp. 2003) (if requested by either party); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18,
§ 6855 (1999) (malpractice cases only); Florida: Santa Lucia, supra note 60, at
41 (citing Meadowbrook Health Care Servs. of Fla. v. Acosta, 617 So. 2d 1104
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. 51-12-5.1 (d) (West 2003);
I11. Stat 5/2-1115.05 (2004); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(4) (West
2000) (if requested by either party); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-
65(b)-(d) (Supp. 2004); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13 (West
2000) (bifurcation if defendant requests); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §
10-25(a) (2003); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11 (Michie
1996 & Supp. 2003); Virginia: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wade, 579 S.E.2d 180, 185
(Va. 2003); and Wisconsin: Russell v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 571 N.W.2d 924
(Wis. 1997).
144. These states include Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(c) (Michie
Supp. 2003); California: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (West 1997); Connecticut:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1999) (mandating court-determined
punitive damages in products liability litigation); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §
51-12-5.1(d)(2) (West 2003); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3402, 60-3702
(1994); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(2) (West Supp. 2004); Montana:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (2003); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
42.005(3) (Michie 2002); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11
(Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)
(Supp. 2005); Tennessee: Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901
(Tenn. 1992); Texas: Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30
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plaintiffs counsel will typically introduce evidence of corporate
wealth and other aggravating circumstances affecting the amount of
the punitive award. Bifurcation may be imposed by the state
legislature or be adopted by the state's highest court as a form of
judicial tort reform. Several jurisdictions provide for a mandatory
review of the jury's award of punitive damages at the conclusion of
the second phase of a bifurcated trial. 45 In these states, the jury
establishes liability while the trial judge sets the amount of punitive
damages. 1
46
The procedure protection of bifurcation has sometimes been
ordered by state supreme courts, as in Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co.
147
The bifurcation of punitive damages from the rest of the trial
prevents the jury from hearing potentially inflammatory punitive
damages evidence until punitive liability is established.14
8
Bifurcation has doctrinal symmetry with the remedy of punitive
damages as being functionally equivalent to criminal sentencing.
The empirical research on bifurcation reveals that it may not reduce
punitive damages, but that it does increase the size of verdicts.1
49
Bifurcation is a pro-defendant reform because it also gives the
defendant an opportunity to present mitigatory circumstances that
(Tex. 1994); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (Supp. 2004); and Wyoming:
Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981).
145. For example, Montana provides for a mandatory post-verdict review of
the amount of the jury's punitive damages award. See MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-221(7) (2003) ("When the jury returns a verdict finding a defendant liable
for punitive damages, the amount of punitive damages must then be
determined by the jury in an immediate, separate proceeding and be submitted
to the judge for review .... ").
146. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1999) ("If the trier of fact
determines that punitive damages should be awarded" in a products liability
action, "the court shall determine the amount of such damages not to exceed an
amount equal to twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff'); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3702(a)-(b) (1994) ("In any civil action in which exemplary or
punitive damages are recoverable, the trier of fact shall determine, concurrent
with all other issues presented, whether such damages shall be allowed. If
such damages are allowed, a separate proceeding shall be conducted by the
court to determine the amount of such damages to be awarded.... At the
conclusion of the proceeding, the court shall determine the amount of
exemplary or punitive damages to be awarded.").
147. 833 S.W.2d at 901.
148. Robbennolt, supra note 9, at 179.
149. Id. at 182.
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may lessen the amount of punitive damages or obviate them without
compromising basic liability.' 50 The bifurcation of punitive damages
from the rest of the trial prevents the jury from being unduly
influenced by evidence that may create bias against large
corporations. The purpose of bifurcation is to prevent evidence of
aggravating circumstances or wealth of the defendant from creating
jury bias in the compensatory damages stage.
F. Increasing Evidentiary Standard of Proof
The vast majority of jurisdictions have raised the standard of
proof in punitive damages litigation from that of a preponderance of
the evidence to that of "clear and convincing evidence."' 51 Colorado
is the only jurisdiction that requires plaintiffs to prove punitive
damages "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 52 The adoption of a higher
standard of proof than the usual "preponderance of evidence"
standard is another example of a pro-defendant tort reform. The
reform of "clear and convincing" evidence is doctrinally symmetrical
150. Santa Lucia, supra note 60, at 41 (citing Meadowbrook Health Care Servs.
of Fla. v. Acosta, 617 So.2d 1104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
151. See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993); Alaska: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.020(b) (Michie Supp. 2003); Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-207
(Michie Supp. 2003); Arizona: Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723
P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986); California: CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West
1997); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (b) (West 2003); Hawaii: Masaki
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 575 (Haw. 1989); Indiana: IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-51-3-2 (Michie 1998); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.l(1)(a)
(West 1998); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (1994); Kentucky: KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Michie 1992); Maine: Tuttle v. Raymond, 494
A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985); Maryland: Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d
633, 658 (Md. 1992); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West 2000);
Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp. 2004); Montana: MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (2003); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005(1)
(Michie 2002); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12 (West 2000); North
Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003);
2004 Ohio Laws 144 (effective Apr. 7, 2005); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (Supp. 2005); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (2003);
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law Co-op Supp. 2003); South
Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (Michie 1987); Tennessee: Hodges v.
S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992); Texas: TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (Supp. 2004-2005); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-18-1(1)(a) (Supp. 2004); Wisconsin: Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294
N.W.2d 437, 458 (Wis. 1980).
152. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (2001).
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with the function of punitive damages as patrolling the conduct on
the borderline between crime and tort. 153  There is no empirical
research, however, on whether increasing the standard of proof
makes a difference in punitive damages litigation. 154  Raising the
standard of proof presumably "makes it more difficult for jurors to
find punitive damages liability."' 155 The trend toward "clear and
convincing" evidence is doctrinally consistent with the role of
punitive damages as a remedy on the borderland between crime and
tort.
G. Punitive Damages Liability Standard
A large number of states have enacted statutes that specify the
state of mind required for punitive damages.156 In general, the
culpability leading to punitive damages varies from gross negligence
in some states to actual malice in others.' 57  A recent survey
153. Robbennolt, supra note 9, at 176.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 177.
156. BLATT ET AL., supra note 73, at 162-69.
157. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-653.02-.03 (West 2003) (requiring
actual malice in action for libel or slander); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West
1997) (noting that punitive damages may be recovered upon proof of fraud, or
malice in action for breach of non-contractual obligation); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 6855 (1999) (requiring malice or willful or wanton misconduct in health
care malpractice insurance action); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (2003) (requiring finding of actual malice or
actual fraud); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 41.337 (Michie 2002) (requiring actual
malice to support punitive damages award in libel or slander action); id. §
42.005(1) (Michie 2002) (requiring oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
implied, in action for breach of non-contractual obligation); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A: 15-5.12 (West 2000) (requiring in product liability actions that tortious
conduct be actuated by actual malice or accompanied by wanton and willful
disregard of safety of product users or others who foreseeably might be harmed
by product); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-35(2) (2003) (malice); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 32-03.2-11 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003) (requiring oppression, fraud,
or actual or presumed malice in actions for breach of non-contractual
obligation); 2004 Ohio Laws 144 (effective Apr. 7, 2005) (requiring that acts or
omissions of defendant demonstrate malice, aggravated or egregious fraud);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-29.1 (2003) (stating that conduct to be motivated by
malice or ill-will and that such conduct involves reckless or callous
indifference to statutorily protected right of others); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-
1-4.1 (Michie 1987) (requiring willful, wanton, or malicious conduct on part of
defendant); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-52(5) (Michie 2000) (allowing recovery of
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concluded that twelve states now require proof that a defendant was
acting maliciously in order to recover punitive damages.' 58 Another
twenty-six states require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
culpability is greater than gross negligence.' 59  The predicate for
Alabama punitive damages is "oppression," "fraud," "wantonness,"
and "malice."' 60 Thus, the trend in the law is toward increasing the
standard of conduct required for punitive damages. The range of the
defendant's culpability varies from gross negligence to the predicate
of actual malice; no jurisdiction permits the recovery of punitive
damages for mere negligence. A majority of states follow the
Restatement (Second) of Tort standard for punitive damages, which
requires "conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil
motive or ... reckless indifference to the rights of others."'
161
H. Jury Instructions for Punitive Damages
The U.S. Supreme Court observed that jury instructions about
punitive damages that "typically leave the jury with wide discretion
in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a
defendant's net worth [that] creates the potential that juries will use
their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly
those without strong local presences."' 62 The reality is that state tort
reforms have resulted in twenty-two states enacting statutes
mandating detailed jury instructions. 163  Alabama, California,
punitive damages for willful or wanton conduct or recklessness evincing
conscious disregard for safety of others).
158. BLATT ET AL., supra note 73, at 162-63 (stating that the conduct
requirement of a showing of malice is required in Arizona, California,
Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia).
159. Id. at 164-66 (stating that the following states require proof of conduct
beyond gross negligence but less than malice: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming).
160. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979). See, e.g., Inland
Container Corp. v. March, 529 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tenn. 1975); Beggs v.
Universal C.I.T Corp., 409 S.W.2d 719,724 (Mo. 1966).
162. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
163. BLATT ET AL., supra note 73, §3.3 at 175 (noting that states providing
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Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, and New Jersey have
enacted statutes requiring juries to be instructed about the purpose of
punitive damages. 64 California for example, requires that juries
receive explanations of the meanings of "fraud," "malice," and
"oppression."' 165 Colorado's statute requires that the jury receive the
definition of "willful and wanton conduct."'' 66 Kentucky's mandated
jury instructions define "oppression," "fraud," and "malice."' 167 The
widespread use of model jury instructions also provides juries with
greater guidance in awarding punitive damages, which presumably
provides defendants with another layer of protection. The empirical
research supports initiatives to give jurors more guidance, 168 but the
Supreme Court's critique of jury instructions does not accurately
reflect the developments in the states.
jury instructions on punitive damages are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
164. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(b)(l)-(3) (1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-102(l)(b) (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(1)(a)-(c) (Michie
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-221(2)-(4) (2003).
165. California spells out the definition of each predicate for punitive
damages. For example, the jury may award punitive damages "where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of
oppression, fraud, or malice." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997).
"'Malice' means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a
willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Id.
§ 3294(c)(1). "'Oppression' means despicable conduct that subjects a person
to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights." Id.
§ 3294(c)(2). "'Fraud' means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the
part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights
or otherwise causing injury." Id. § 3294(c)(3). See also ALA. CODE
§ 6-11-20(b)(1)-(3), (5) (1993) (defining fraud, malice and wantonness).
166. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(l)(b) (2001).
167. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(1)(a)-(c) (Michie 1992).
168. Robbennolt, supra note 9, at 144.
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I. Verdict Restrictions
1. Form of Verdict
A number of states have passed tort reform statutes requiring
that punitive damages be awarded by a special verdict. In those
states, judges are required to address the issue of punitive damages in
a special verdict. 169 In court-tried cases, the judge is required to
render a special verdict for punitive damages. 170 Georgia requires
that the trier of fact indicate the award of punitive damages "through
an appropriate form of verdict, along with the other required
findings."' 7'1 Iowa's punitive damages tort reform statute requires the
court to instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories about
punitive damages.'72 Greater guidance in jury instructions and verdict
forms are reforms designed to educate the jury and make it more likely
that punitive damages awards are based upon a factual foundation.
2. Multiple Punitive Damages for the Same Conduct
A few jurisdictions restrict the number of punitive damages for
the same mass product defect or course of conduct. The goal is to
prevent overkill; punitive damages should sting, but not bankrupt the
corporate defendant. 173  The multiple punishment problem in
punitive damages litigation has been "the most discussed and
debated issue in the law of punitive damages."' 174 Georgia enacted a
one-award provision for punitive damages in products liability.' 75 A
federal court found this provision to be unconstitutional. 176  In
169. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.85(4)(b) (West Supp. 2004).
170. See, e.g., id. (noting that the judge shall submit to the jury a special
verdict as to punitive damages or, if the case is tried to the court, the judge
shall issue a special verdict as to punitive damages).
171. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1) (West 2003).
172. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(l)-(2) (West 1998).
173. Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV.
583, 587 (2003).
174. Id.
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f).
176. McBride v. Gen. Motor Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(holding that Georgia's state-sharing scheme violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Georgia and U.S. Constitution).
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Florida, the trial judge determines whether prior punitive damages
awards are sufficient to punish a defendant's behavior. 1
77
Missouri enacted a complicated tort reform that permits the
defendant to obtain credits for prior punitive damages.'7 8 Assuming
there are prior damages awards for the same conduct, the defendant
can request a hearing on whether the amount awarded by the jury as
punitive damages may be credited with amounts previously paid for
punitive damages arising out of that same conduct. If the court finds
that the previous award did arise out of the same conduct, the
defendant must show that it did not "unreasonably continue the
conduct after acquiring actual knowledge of the dangerous nature of
such conduct."' 179  Missouri also proscribes multiple punitive
damages for the same conduct. 180  The states that have placed
arbitrary limits on the number of punitive damages awards are
seeking to address the problem of multiple awards bankrupting the
defendant. A more balanced approach would be to permit the
defendant to introduce evidence of prior punitive damages in the
second stage of a bifurcated proceeding rather than to arbitrarily cut
off liability.
J. Post- Verdict Review for Excessiveness
1. Passion or Prejudice Test
Punitive damages have a high "mortality rate" in the post-verdict
period because trial and appellate courts have applied rigorous
standards of review to such awards. 18 1 The high rate of reversal or
reduction of punitive damages is emblematic of extensive judicial
control. In addition to post-trial reviews at the state level, the U.S.
Supreme Court requires courts to conduct an excessiveness review to
determine whether an award complies with due process.'82 "While
177. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (2)(b) (West Supp. 2004).
178. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (West Supp. 2004) (describing procedure
for crediting past awards arising out of same conduct).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., MARK PETERSON ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 27-30 (1987); see also Rustad &
Koenig, supra note 8, at 1012.
182. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) (finding
Spring 2005] 1329
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1297
states possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it
is well established that there are procedural and substantive
constitutional limitations on these awards."'' 83 Every state prescribes
its own method for reviewing the excessiveness of punitive
damages.184  The states employ general standards such as the
"passion or prejudice"' 85 or "shock the conscience" 186 tests to
determine whether punitive awards are excessive.' 87 The majority of
U.S. Supreme Court justices believe that in addition to state judicial
Oregon's state constitutional provision prohibiting post-verdict reviews of
punitive damages for excessiveness as being violative of procedural due
process); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1995) (instructing
reviewing punitive damages to consider three guideposts: "(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the
jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases").
183. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
184. See, e.g., Goucher v. Dinneen, 471 A.2d 688, 689 (Me. 1984) ("The
award of punitive damages... is within the sound discretion of the fact finder
after weighing all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors"); Hanover Ins.
Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156, 158 (Me. 1983) (using an abuse of discretion
standard for review of punitive damages decision).
185. Olmstead v. First Interstate Bank of Fargo, N.A., 449 N.W.2d 804, 809
(N.D. 1989) (citations omitted) ("We will not overturn an exemplary damages
award as excessive absent passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Passion
means that the jury was motivated by feelings or emotions rather than by the
evidence. Prejudice includes forming an opinion without due knowledge or
examination.").
186. See id. at 807; Folks v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 755 P.2d 1319, 1336
(Kan. 1988).
187. Folks, 755 P.2d at 1335-36, states:
The award of punitive damages will not be set aside unless the trial
judge finds that the award (1) was based on passion, prejudice or bias;
(2) was based on mistake of law or fact; or (3) lacked evidentiary
support.... Where a verdict is so excessive and out of proportion to
the damages sustained as to shock the conscience of the court and
judgment has been entered, the trial judge may tentatively affirm the
judgment, provided that the plaintiff will accept a reduced judgment,
or may grant a new trial.... [I]f the appellate court determines the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the award of
punitive damages, but the award is so excessive and out of proportion
as to shock the conscience of the appellate court, the appellate court
may tentatively affirm the judgment and allow the plaintiff to either
accept a reduced amount or be granted a new trial on the issue of
punitive damages....
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controls, there are due process limitations on the discretion of juries
to award punitive damages.'
88
Perhaps the most common test.is some variant of the passion or
prejudice test.' 89 The test asks whether a punitive damages award is
so large as to create an inference that it was the product of juror bias.
For example, in Minnesota, reviewing courts have a standard of review
that tests for juror bias:
The trial court, having heard the testimony and observed the
parties and witnesses, is in a better position than this court
to determine whether the damages were given under the
influence of passion and prejudice, and in the absence of a
clear abuse of that discretion its action will not be
reversed. 190
As such, the Minnesota court's reviewing role is "to determine whether
the damages were given under the influence of passion and prejudice,
and in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion its action will not
be reversed."' 191 The standard is substantially similar in Alaska: "A
punitive damage award is excessive if it is manifestly unreasonable,
resulting from passion or prejudice or disregard of the rules of law.
Relevant factors include the compensatory damage amount, [the]
magnitude of the offense, the importance of the policy violated, and the
defendant's wealth."'
' 92
188. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L. J. 2071, 2087 (1998) ("Hence a
majority of recent Justices ... have argued that the Due Process Clause
requires constraints on jury discretion that will provide fair notice to potential
defendants and limit the role of arbitrary or irrelevant factors.").
189. For example, Delaware punitive damages verdicts "will not be disturbed
as excessive unless it is so clearly so as to indicate that it was the result of passion,
prejudice, partiality, or corruption; or that it was manifestly the result of disregard
of the evidence or applicable rules of law. A verdict should not be set aside
unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of
justice; and unless the injustice of allowing the verdict to stand is clear."
Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 892 (Del. 1983) (quoting
Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 717-18 (Del. 1970)).
190. Robinson v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
191. Id.
192. Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 949 (Alaska 1986)
(citations omitted).
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In Connecticut, punitive damages are strictly limited to the cost of
litigation. 193  However, a remittitur will be granted even though a
verdict "is so clearly excessive as to indicate that the jury [was] unduly
swayed by sympathy for the plaintiff."' 94 New Jersey's "passion and
prejudice" test refers not only to the possibility of passion or prejudice,
but also to juror error in determining whether a punitive award is
excessive.
195
2. Shock the Conscience Test
The "shock the conscience" test differs only in semantics from the
"passion and prejudice" test. 196 "A verdict should not be set aside
unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock the Court's conscience and
sense of justice; and unless the injustice of allowing the verdict to stand
is clear."'197 The Colorado Supreme Court combined the "shock the
conscience" test with the "passion and prejudice" test:
[A]bsent an award so excessive.., as to shock the judicial
conscience and to raise an irresistible inference that passion,
193. Alaimo v. Royer, 448 A.2d 207, 209-10 (Conn. 1982); see also
Vandersluis v. Weil, 407 A.2d 982, 986 (Conn. 1978) (limiting punitive damages
to costs of litigation).
194. Seaman v. Dexter, 114 A. 75, 76 (Conn. 1921).
195. Leimgruber v. Claridge Assocs., 375 A.2d 652, 657 (N.J. 1977) ("This
Court has held that verdicts should be upset for being excessive only in clear
cases, that damage awards will not be set aside unless so excessive as
irresistibly to give rise to the inference of mistake, passion, prejudice or
partiality, or are so disproportionate as to shock the conscience, or the
sustaining of the award would result in a manifest denial of justice." (citations
omitted)).
196. The Arizona Supreme Court's variant of the test states: "The
appropriate test of passion or prejudice is whether the verdict is 'so manifestly
unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court."'
Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1084 (Ariz. 1987) (citing
Lindsenmeyer v. Hancock, 533 P.2d 1181, 1185 (1985)); see also id. ("The test
to be applied... is whether the 'verdict is so outrageously excessive as to
suggest, at first blush, passion or prejudice."').
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a federal appeals
court decision upholding Arkansas' "shock the conscience" standard for punitive
damages. See Todd P. Lewis, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damage Awards
in Arkansas: Will the Conscience of the Court be Shocked? Robertson Oil Co.,
Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 49 ARK. L. REv. 161, 167 (1996).
197. Cloroben Chem. Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887, 892 (Del. 1983)
(quoting Riegel v. Aastad, 272 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1970)).
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prejudice, corruption or other improper cause invaded the
trial, the jury's determination of the fact is considered
inviolate. 19
8  . -
Mississippi courts determine whether a punitive damages award is "so
excessive that it should be altered or amended when it evinces passion,
bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the
conscience." 1 99 The court explained that the shock the conscience test
is not based upon an individual judge's reaction to a large punitive
damages award, but to the abstract notion of the judicial conscience.
20 0
Alabama's post-verdict standard requires the trial judge to conduct a de
novo post-verdict hearing to evaluate whether a given award is
excessive. 20 1 Iowa does not permit courts to enter a remittitur in order
198. Hurd v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 503 (10th Cir. 1984);
Higgs v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 840, 860-62 (Colo. 1985). Colorado, like many
other states, has enacted new punitive damages statutes fortifying the standard
of review. Colorado's punitive damages statute gives the court more discretion
to remit or reverse punitive damages: "[T]he court may reduce or disallow the
award of exemplary damages to the extent that: (a) The deterrent effect of the
damages has been accomplished; or (b) The conduct which resulted in the
award has ceased; or (c) The purpose of such damages has otherwise been
served." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(2) (2001).
199. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 278 (Miss.
1985).
200. Id.
201. In Alabama, the trial judge must determine whether the amount of
punitive damages awarded by a jury is excessive. Hammond v. City of
Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (Ala. 1986). Punitive damages awarded
"must not exceed an amount that will accomplish society's goals of
punishment and deterrence." Green Oil v. Homsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala.
1989). The so-called "Hammond order" requires the judge to determine
whether the amount of punitive damages is "not excessive." Hammond, 493
So. 2d at 1379. The statute provides that "[n]o presumption of correctness
shall apply as to the amount of punitive damages awarded by the trier of fact."
ALA. CODE § 6-11-23 (1993).
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991),
the Court approved of Alabama's process for awarding punitive damages and
stated "[t]he Alabama Supreme Court's postverdict review ensures that
punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory damages."
Further, the Court noted that Alabama's post-trial review accomplishes the
following: (1) it determines whether there is a reasonable relationship between
the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's
conduct; (2) it examines the harm that actually has occurred from the
defendant's conduct; (3) it discerns the degree of reprehensibility of the
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to cure excessive punitive damages awards.202 The standard of review
requires excessive awards to be vacated or set aside entirely.20 3
3. Fortified Tests for Excessiveness
The U.S. Supreme Court in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg20 4 held
that post-verdict excessiveness reviews were required to determine
whether punitive damages awards comport with due process. 20 5 After
Oberg, Oregon adopted a post-verdict standard of review that asks the
simple question whether a given punitive damages award is within the
range of a rational jury.206  Similarly, Maryland's appellate courts
revised its standard of review to comply with federal constitutional
guidelines.207 A number of states provide detailed guidance in relation
to excessiveness that goes far beyond merely asking whether damage
awards comport with due process. 0 8
A number of other states have strengthened their post-verdict
review procedures. Illinois, for example, gives the trial judge the
discretion to "determine whether a jury award for punitive damages is
excessive, and if so, enter a remittitur and a conditional new trial." 20 9
Alabama grants no presumption of correctness of punitive damages
when its appellate court conducts independent excessiveness
reviews.210
In 1991, South Carolina's Supreme Court implemented new
guidelines for reviewing punitive damages awards.21' The net effect of
defendant's conduct; (4) it measures the profitability to the defendant of the
conduct; and (5) it looks at the "financial position" of the defendant. Id. at 21-
22.
202. Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850, 861 (Iowa 1973).
203. Team Cent., Inc. v. Teamco, Inc., 271 N.W.2d 914, 926 (Iowa 1978).
204. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
205. Id. at 434-35.
206. Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473, 483-84 (Or. 2001).
207. In Alexander & Alexander v. Evander, 596 A.2d 687, 709 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991), Maryland's Court of Special Appeals held that the trial judge should
review the verdict, apply the same standards as Haslip, and assure that the size of
the award will "accomplish society's goals." The Haslip Court approved
Alabama's "Hammond Order" standard of review. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1991).
208. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.74(5) (West 1997).
209. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 2003).
210. ALA. CODE § 6-11-24 (1993).
211. Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354-55 (S.C. 1991).
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developments in these and other states has been to fortify judicial
control over jury awards, which has led to a high rate of reversals or
reductions in punitive damages: "All of the [empirical] studies
examining post-verdict adjustments confirm that punitive damages
are strictly scrutinized by trial and appellate judges." 212 In general,
appellate courts seldom reverse or reduce compensatory damages,
and they carefully and thoroughly scrutinize punitive damages.
213
L. Joint and Several Punitive Liability
Punitive damages have been assessed jointly and severally since
the English case of Merryweather v. Nixan.2 14 Courts permitted the
jury to hear evidence of the joint tortfeasor's culpability and wealth if
they were implicated in the wrongdoing. 215 The policy underlying
joint and several punitive damages can be traced to judicial
unwillingness to entertain or adjust claims of aggravated
wrongdoing.216 Joint and several punitive liability is not only fair, but
it brings common sense to the common law-in a modem products
liability action, there will frequently be several corporate defendants
involved in an indivisible chain of manufacture, distribution, and sale,
which may also involve foreign defendants.217
212. See Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages, supra note 9, at 40.
213. Id.
214. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
215. See, e.g., Lyons v. Williams, 567 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Ala. 1990)
(permitting joint and several unapportioned punitive damages against several
relatives of the deceased in an action, for conversion); Huckeby v. Spangler,
563 S.W.2d 555, 558, 560 (Tenn. 1978) (permitting apportionment of punitive
damages); Odom v. Gray, 508 S.W.2d 526, 533-34 (Tenn. 1974) (allowing
joint and several punitive damages); J.J.B. Enters. v. Boat Works, Inc., 472
N.W.2d 790, 796 (Wis. 1991) (imposing joint and several punitive damages in
a case involving a distribution chain for the sale of a used boat).
216. See Morris, supra note 65, at 1192-93.
217. In cases involving foreign parent corporations and American
subsidiaries, it may be difficult to apportion wrongdoing. It is frequently the
case where the joint corporate structures are inextricably linked and there may
be an indivisible chain of wrongdoing from the importation and sale of a
defective product to the failure of recall after a problem is detected. See, e.g.,
Stokes v. Geismar, 815 F.Supp. 904, 906-07 (E.D. Va. 1993). Forbidding
joint and several liability where there is an interlocking parent and subsidiary
may encourage the parent corporation to "isolate those [risky] activities in
separate subsidiary corporations." Richard A. Westin & Sanford E. Gaines,
The Relationship of Federal Income Taxes to Toxic Wastes: A Selective Study,
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States vary in their willingness to extend the doctrine of joint and
several liability to punitive damages. 218 One of the unfair aspects of
applying joint and several punitive liability is that that it may force a
codefendant to pay the entire punitive award where it has a lower level
of culpability or fewer financial resources. If joint and several punitive
damages are not permitted, however, the risk of an insolvent co-
defendant is reallocated to the plaintiff. The requirement of
apportioned punitive damages permits defendants to use complicated
corporate structures as a shield.21 9 It is fair to both parties to assess
punitive damages on combined net worth when the entities constitute
an "interlocking... monolith. '22 0  The risk that an interlocking
company will isolate its wrongdoing in undercapitalized subsidiaries is
a serious concern. 221 The abolition of joint punitive damages is yet
another example of judicial tort reform favoring corporate defendants.
16 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REv. 753, 783 (1989).
218. For example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed a joint and
several liability punitive damages award against several joint tortfeasors in the
distribution chain involved in the sale of a used boat in Radford v. JJB.
Enterprises, 472 N.W.2d 790 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). However, Wisconsin
enacted a statute prohibiting joint and several punitive damages. See Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 895.85(5) (West Supp. 2004) (noting that the rule of joint and
several liability does not apply to punitive damages). The Tennessee Supreme
Court permitted joint and several punitive damages in Odom v. Gray, 508
S.W.2d 526, 533-34 (Tenn. 1974), and in Huckeby v. Spangler, 563 S.W.2d
555, 558 (Tenn. 1978), the court found it unobjectionable to base a joint and
several punitive damages award upon the net worth or assets of only one of
several punitive damage defendants. The Alabama Supreme Court held that
punitive damages in wrongful death actions may not be apportioned among
joint tortfeasors. See Tatum v. Schering Corp., 523 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Ala.
1988).
219. Cf Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 442 F.2d 619, 622 (10th Cir. 1971) (not
permitting a complicated corporate structure to prevent plaintiff recovery in a
case involving the joint marketing of a defective Dodge truck).
220. George v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 215, 258
(Ct. App. 1989), affd on remand, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473 (Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming joint and several punitive liability but ordering bifurcated
proceeding and retrial on other grounds).
221. See Bell v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68 (1854) (noting how a wealth
defendant principally implicated in a wrong, might escape payment of just and
reasonable damages by "having others, without character or property,
associated in the unlawful act.").
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M. Judicial Tort Reforms of Punitive Damages Procedures
In 1994, the United States Supreme Court began to formulate
new judicial reforms for punitive damages procedures applicable to
all jurisdictions. It struck down a succession of four large punitive
awards against out-of-state corporations. 222  Two reforms deserve
special mention here.
1. Mandatory Post-Verdict Excessiveness Review
In the 1994 case of Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,223 the Court
ruled that a state constitutional prohibition against post-verdict
reviews of punitive damages for excessiveness violated procedural
due process. 224 Oregon's constitution did not permit either trial or
appellate courts to review the amount of punitive damages for
excessiveness. 225 After the Oberg case, many states reviewed and
even fortified post-verdict procedures for assessing the excessiveness
of punitive awards.
226
2. De Novo Federal Standard of Review
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Leatherman Tool Co. v. Cooper
Industries,227 held that federal appellate courts must apply a de novo
standard when conducting excessiveness reviews of punitive
222. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 415 (1994) (vacating a
multi-million dollar punitive damages award against a Japanese manufacturer
on the grounds that Oregon did not provide for a mandated post-verdict review
of the award for excessiveness); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
585-86 (1996) (reversing multi-million dollar award against U.S. subsidiary of
German automobile company on grounds that the award was so excessive as to
violate substantive due process); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, 532 U.S. 424, 424 (2001) (vacating large punitive damages award in
trade dress case because federal appellate court applied the wrong standard of
review); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408
(2003) (reversing an award of $145 million in punitive damages, where full
compensatory damages were $1 million, as excessive and in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
223. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
224. Id. at 434-35.
225. Id. at 418-19.
226. See supra note 222.
227. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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damages rather than the more deferential standard of abuse of
discretion used in reviewing compensatory damages.
228
Prior to the Court's ruling, a number of federal appeals courts
had applied the less deferential abuse of discretion standard in
punitive damages cases. 229 After Cooper, a defendant is entitled to
greater due process at the appellate, as well as the trial, level. 230 The
defendant is constitutionally entitled to a "fresh" review of the
amount of punitive damages without deference to the lower court's
findings.23' Substantive and procedural due process, augmented by
detailed jury instructions and state post-verdict procedures,
contemplate a greater role for trial judges in controlling the size of
punitive damages and provide another procedural guarantee that
punitive damages fit the wrong.
VI. SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Capping the Size or Ratio of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages have historically been awarded in view of the
enormity of the wrongdoing, rather than being limited by some
arbitrary mathematical formula.232 The legislative purpose of caps is
to preclude even the possibility of excessive awards by placing an
absolute limit upon awards, or by limiting punitive damages to a
specified ratio of compensatory damages. Capping punitive damages
or limiting them to a fixed amount or ratio is perhaps the most
radical tort reform in terms of its impact on deterrence. Capping
punitive damages undermines the unpredictability of punitive
damages that makes the defendant think twice before engaging in
wrongful conduct that may be profitable, but which violates
community norms or disregards the public welfare.233 The ostensible
228. Id. at 436.
229. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 80-81
(1st Cir. 2001) (describing the standard of review prior to Cooper, and the
effect of Cooper on its decision).
230. Cooper Indust., Inc. V. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 443
(2001); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996)
(outlining considerations for assessing punitive damages).
231. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436.
232. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (1 How.) 363,371 (1851).
233. See Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages, supra note 8, at 85-88.
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purpose of the cap is to address the excessiveness problem directly
by eliminating jury discretion. The following table shows the
punitive damages cap in each of the states.
TABLE 1: AN AUDIT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS
JURISDICTION TYPE OF CAP SPECIFIC FEATURES
Basic treble damages
Variable cap that v s or $500,000 limit,
Vaial cmp t vanes whichever is greater,
ALABAMA with company's net but adjusts the caporth & type of injury.
Inflation-adjusted.
2 34  according to a
company's size and
net worth.235
Variable cap based
upon the greater of a The greater of three
ALASKA ratio, a fixed amount times compensatory
and the defendant's damages or
motivation for financial $500,000.236
gain. No exceptions.
234. Alabama Code Section 6-11-21(f) states:
As to all the fixed sums for punitive damage limitations set out herein
in subsections (a), (b), and (d), those sums shall be adjusted as of
January 1, 2003, and as of January 1 at three-year intervals thereafter,
at an annual rate in accordance with the Consumer Price Index rate.
ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(f) (Supp. 2003).
235. Alabama Code Section § 6-11-21(a)-(c) provides:
Except as provided in subsections (b), (d), and (j), in all civil actions
where an entitlement to punitive damages shall have been established
under applicable laws, no award of punitive damages shall exceed
three times the compensatory damages of the party claiming punitive
damages or five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), whichever is
greater. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) and (j), in all civil
actions where entitlement to punitive damages shall have been
established under applicable law against a defendant who is a small
business, no award of punitive damages shall exceed fifty thousand
dollars ($50,000) or 10 percent of the business' net worth, whichever
is greater.
Id. § 6-11-21(a)-(c).
236. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Michie Supp. 2003); Alaska's statutory
cap on punitive damages and non-economic damages was upheld in Evans ex
reL Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002).
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JURISDICTION TYPE OF CAP SPECIFIC FEATURES
Fixed cap based upon The greater of three
the greater of a ratio and times compensatory
ARKANSAS a fixed amount, damages orexception for intentional $250,000. 237
harm.
Fixed ratio, but
increases if the
defendant is a recidivist emplary damages
COLORADO or continues may not be greater
misconduct. No than compensatory
exceptions. damages.
Punitive damages are
limited to the
''expenses of litigation
less taxable costs."
2 39
Fixed ratio & judge- In products liabilityCONNECTICUT assessed. No litigation, punitive
exceptionso damages may not
ee s"exceed an amount
equal to twice the
damages awarded to
the plaintiff.,
240
The greater of three
times compensatory
Fixed cap based upon a damages or $500,000.If the defendant was
FLORIDA ratio and a fixed mtivated y
amount. No exceptions. motivated by
unreasonable financial
gain, cap is increased
to four times the
237. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208 (Michie Supp. 2003).
238. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2001).
239. Nat'l Semiconductor Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 1195,
1201 (D. Conn. 1982).
240. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1999) (stating that punitive
damages may be awarded in products liability litigation).
1340
PUNITIVE DAMAGES' IRON CA GE
JURISDICTION TYPE OF CAP SPECIFIC FEATURES
compensatory
damages or $2 million,
whichever is greater.
No cap if there is
proof of the
defendant's specific
intent.
241
Fixed amount;
exception for products
liability cases and acts Capped at $250,000;
GEORGIA committed with specific Exceptions for
intent to harm and cases intentional harm. 242
arising out of misuse of
alcohol or drugs.
Fixed cap based upon a No greater than three
ratio and a fixed times compensatory
amount. No exceptions. damages or
$250,000.243
No greater than threeFixed Cap Based Upon times compensatory
INDIANA Ratio & Fixed Amount. times oda ages or
No exceptions. $50,000.244
The lesser of the
defendant's annual
Variable cap based gross income or $5
upon the defendant's million, unless the
profits or $5 million, defendant profits from
KANSAS Increased cap if there is her misconduct
proof of the defendant's beyond this amount, in
profits from which case the court
misconduct. No may award "an
exceptions. amount equal to 1 1/2
times the amount of
profit which the
241. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (West Supp. 2004).
242. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (West 2003).
243. IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(3) (Michie 2004).
244. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (Michie 1998).
1341Spring 2005]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1297
JURISDICTION TYPE OF CAP SPECIFIC FEATURES
defendant gained or is
expected to gain as a
result of the
defendant's
misconduct. "
245
No punitive damages,
except as authorized by Louisiana has a destatute. facto cap of zero. 246
No punitive damages, Massachusetts has a de
S except as authorized by facto cap of zero forstatute.247  common law punitive
damages.
Limited to Michigan does not
compensation for recognize theMICHIGAN injured feelings, punishment and
deterrence function of
punitive damages.
248
50 million: cap of 2%
of the defendant's net
worth; net worth of $0
to $50 million to $100
million: cap of $2.5
Variable cap based million; net worth of
upon the defendant's $100 million to $500
MISSISSIPI net worth. No million: cap of $3.75exceptions. million; net worth of
$500 million-$750
million: cap of $5
million; net worth of
$750 million-$1
billion: cap of $15
million; net worth of
245. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e)-(f) (1994).
246. Fairley v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 689 So. 2d 736, 737 (La.
Ct. App. 1997).
247. Santana v. Registrars of Voters, 502 N.E.2d 132, 135 (Mass. 1986).
248. See, e.g., Veselenak v. Smith, 327 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Mich. 1982);
Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Mich. 1981).
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JURISDICTION TYPE OF CAP SPECIFIC FEATURES
more than $1 billion:
cap of $20 million
maximum.
249
An award for punitive
damages may not
Variable cap based exceed $ 10 million or
MONTANA upon an absolute 3% of a defendant's
amount and upon the net worth, whichever
defendant's net worth. is less. Cap does not
apply to class
actions.
25°
Nebraska does not
recognize punitive
NEBRASKA No punitive damages. damages, and
therefore has a de
facto cap of zero.
251
Limited to three times
the compensatory
damages if
Fixed cap based upon compensatory
fixed ratio and amount, damages equal
NEVADA with minor $100,000 or more, and
exceptions.252  to $300,000 if
compensatory
damages are less than
$100,000.253
Prohibits punitive New Hampshire does
NEW HAMPSHIRE damages. not recognize punitive
damages and therefore
249. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(3)(a) (Supp. 2004).
250. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(3) (2003).
251. See Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960); Miller v.
Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464
N.W.2d 769, 777 (Neb. 1991) (overruled on other grounds).
252. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (Michie 2002); id. § 42.005(2)
(listing exceptions for defective product manufacture, bad faith insurance
practices, violations of state discriminatory housing law, defamation, and toxic
waste disposal violations).
253. Id. § 42.005(1).
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JURISDICTION TYPE OF CAP SPECIFIC FEATURES
has a de facto cap of
zero.
254
"No defendant shall be
liable for punitive
damages in any action
in an amount in excess
Fixed cap based upon a of five times the
NEW JERSEY fixed ratio and amount. liability of that
No exceptions. defendant for
compensatory
damages or $350,000,
whichever is
greater." 255
Punitive damages are
Fixed cap based upon a limited to three times
NORTH fixed ratio and amount, compensatory
CAROLINA No exceptions. damages or $250,000,
whichever is
greater.
256
Limits punitive
damages to the greater
NORTH Fixed cap based upon a of two timesDAKOTA fixed ratio and amount.
No exceptions. compensatory
damages or
$250,000.257
Category I: limited to
Variable cap based compensatory
OKLAHOMA upon the motivation of damages or $100,000
the defendant. No if the defendant is
exceptions. reckless.
Category I: for
254. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997).
255. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (West 2000).
256. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (2003); North Carolina's punitive damages
cap was upheld in Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 562 S.E.2d 82, 95 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002); see also Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 9 (N.C. 2004) (Supreme
Court affirming decision).
257. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(4) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003).
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JURISDICTION TYPE OF CAP SPECIFIC FEATURES
intentional or
malicious conduct, cap
is the greater of
$500,000 or two times
compensatory
damages.
Category III" cap is
lifted if there is "clear
and convincing
evidence" of the
defendant's intentional
or malicious acts.258
Fixed cap based upon a
fixed ratio and amount.
Exception for felonious
behavior.
Cap on punitive
damages equal to the
greater of two times
economic damages
plus non-economic
damages up to
$750,000, or
$200,000.
Exemptions for
intentional acts such as
criminal felonies.
259
VIRGINIA Fixed amount. No C 260
exceptions. Cap of $350,000.
258. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B)-(D) (West Supp. 2005).
259. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-
2005). A Texas appeals court held that state's cap on punitive damages did not
violate federal or state constitutional provisions in Seminole Pipeline Co. v.
Broad Leaf Partners, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 730, 758 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2000). The Fourth Circuit upheld
the Virginia cap in Wackenhut Applied Techologies Centers, Inc. v. Sygnetron
Protection Systems, Inc., 979 F.2d 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
Virginia's cap did not violate the due process clause of either the Virginia
Constitution or the U.S. Constitution).
TEXAS
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WASHINGTON No punitive damages. [Washington does not
recognize punitivedamages.
1. De Facto Caps on Punitive Damages Permitted
The jurisdictions not recognizing punitive damages (Louisiana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Washington) have a
de facto cap of zero punitive damages for every cause of action.
New Hampshire has prohibited punitive damages since 1986.262
States that treat punitive damages as mock compensatory damages
also have a de facto cap. Connecticut limits punitive damages to
litigation expenses, 263 whereas Michigan limits punitive damages for
compensation to injured feelings.264 The de facto cap on punitive
damages in these cases is calibrated to a component of compensatory
damages rather than to the usual punishment or deterrence function.
2. Fixed Amounts
Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia enacted tort reforms that capped
punitive damages at a fixed dollar amount. Alabama sets punitive
damages at $500,000 or three times the compensatory damages in
non-wrongful death cases. 265  Virginia's cap for total punitive
damages is set at $350,000,266 whereas Georgia caps punitive
damages at $250,000 and the cap is inapplicable to products liability
litigation and certain intentional torts.267  These fixed amount
jurisdictions cap punitive damages to an absolute dollar amount
without adjustments for inflation or for the seriousness of the
wrongdoing. Absolute dollar amount levels on punitive damages are
261. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1891).
262. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997).
263. Alaimo v. Royer, 448 A.2d 207, 209-10 (Conn. 1982) (quoting
Vandersluis v. Weil, 407 A.2d 982, 986 (Conn. 1978) (citations omitted)).
264. Joba Constr. Co. v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 760, 773 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
265. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(a) (Supp. 2003).
266. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2000).
267. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (West 2003).
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not wealth-sensitive fines and therefore have little or no possibility of
achieving deterrence.
268
3. Fixed Ratios
States adopting the fixed ratio approach limit punitive damages
to a predetermined maximum ratio to the amount of compensatory
damages.2 69 A few states adopt fixed ratios but give the court the
discretion to raise the ratio or level of punitive damages in egregious
circumstances. In Colorado, for example, the court has the discretion
to raise the punitive damages up to three times actual damage if the
wrongful conduct continues during the pendency of the trial.
271
4. Hybrid of Amounts & Ratios
A few jurisdictions meld ratios with fixed amounts to limit
excessive awards. 271 Nevada limits punitive damages to $300,000 in
cases in which compensatory damages are less than $100,000 and up
to three times the compensatory damages in awards of $100,000 or
27227more. This cap does not apply to products liability, however.273
268. Jimmie 0. Clements, Jr., Note, Limiting Punitive Damages: A Placebo
for America's Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 197, 218-19 (1992).
269. See, e.g., Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(3) (2001) (limiting
recovery to three times the amount of actual damages); Florida: FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.73(1)(a) (West Supp. 2004) (stating punitive damages in Florida
may not be greater than three times compensatory damages); Nevada: NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005 (Michie 2002); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 9. 1(B) (West Supp. 2005); and Texas: TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §
41.008(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
270. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2001).
271. Kansas, for example, limits punitive damages to the lesser of five
million dollars or the "defendant's highest gross annual income earned for any
one of the five years immediately before the act for which such damages are
awarded." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e) (1994). The prevailing plaintiff
may bypass the Kansas cap by proving that a defendant expected to make
profit exceeding the maximum damage award. See id. § 60-3702(t) (providing
for exception if expected profits exceed limitation). If the plaintiff qualifies for
the exception, damages may be set at one and one-half times the defendant's
expected profit because of the misconduct. See id. North Dakota limits
punitive damages to no more than twice compensatory damages or $250,000,
whichever is greater. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(4) (Michie
1996 & Supp. 2003).
272. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005 (Michie 2002) (capping punitive
damages at three times actual damages).
273. Id.
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Texas limits punitive damages to four times the amount of actual
damages or $200,000, whichever is greater.
274
Kansas has a hybrid model that limits punitive damages to the
lesser of five million dollars or to the "defendant's highest gross
annual income earned for any one of the five years immediately
before the act for which such damages are awarded., 275 The plaintiff
can circumvent the Kansas cap by proving that a defendant expected
to make a profit exceeding the maximum damage award.276 If the
plaintiff qualifies for the exception, damages may be set at one and
one-half times the defendant's expected profit because of the
misconduct.
277
Arkansas punitive awards may not exceed the greater of
$250,000 or three times compensatory damages, not to exceed one
million dollars.278 The cap may be removed, however, if the fact
finder concludes that the defendant's conduct was intentional and
harmed the plaintiff.279 In intentional malfeasance cases, the
punitive damages cap is not applicable. 280 Arkansas is one of the
few states to adjust the cap for inflation.
281
5. Caps that Vary with the Defendant's Size
or Misconduct
A growing number of jurisdictions have enacted caps that vary
with the defendant's conduct and provide for a safety valve that
contemplates the lifting of the cap if there are sufficient aggravating
circumstances. Alaska, for example, has capped punitive damages at
(1) the greater of three times the compensatory damages awarded to
the plaintiff; or (2) the sum of $ 500,000.282 If the jury determines,
however, that the corporate misconduct was "motivated by financial
gain and the adverse consequences of the conduct were actually
known by the defendant or the person responsible for making policy
274. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon 1997).
275. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e) (1994).
276. See id. § 60-3702(f).
277. Id.
278. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-208(a) (Michie Supp. 2003).
279. Id. § 16-55-208(b).
280. Id.
281. Id. § 16-55-208(c).
282. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f) (Michie Supp. 2003).
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decisions on behalf of the defendant," the jury may award the
greatest of four times compensatory damages, four times the
defendant's financial gain from the misconduct, or seven million
dollars. 283 Alaska imposes a cap based upon a fixed dollar amount
for punitive damages in employment cases.284 In contrast, the
Supreme Court of Alabama has stated that the essential purpose of
punitive damages would be "thwarted if we required that they conform
to any mathematical equation."
285
There is little by way of empirical research on the impact of caps
on deterrence. Commentators argue, however, that capping punitive
damages will erode the deterrent power of this remedy, permitting
firms to predict their liability in advance. 2 86 The risk is that the firm
will conduct risky cost-benefit analyses trading safety for profits.
287
Thus, it is arguable that capping punitive damages cripples the
283. Id. § 09.17.020(g)(l)-(3).
284. Alaska Statute Section 09.17.020(h) states that the amount of punitive
damages awarded by the court or jury may not exceed:
(1) $200,000 if the employer has less than 100 employees in this
state;
(2) $300,000 if the employer has 100 or more but less than 200
employees in this state;
(3) $400,000 if the employer has 200 or more but less than 500
employees in this state; and
(4) $500,000 if the employer has 500 or more employees in this state.
Id. § 09.17.020(h).
285. Assocs. Fin. Servs. Co. v. Barbour, 592 So.2d 191, 199 (Alaska
1992).
286. Some legal commentators argue that capping punitive damages will
lessen the deterrent value of the remedy by permitting firms to conduct cost-
benefit analyses in order to determine the potential profitability of trading
public safety for profits. See, e.g., Sylvia M. Demarest & David E. Jones,
Exemplary Damages as an Instrument of Social Policy: Is Tort Reform in the
Public Interest?, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797, 825 & n.156 (1987) (criticizing
punitive damages caps as arbitrarily imposed, thereby creating disproportionate
results); Clements, supra note 268, at 218-19 (asserting that punitive damages
cap would cause malicious conduct to go undeterred and unpunished); Amelia
J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An
Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 335 (1991) (stating that statutory
punitive damages caps, by allowing potential tortfeasors to calculate maximum
expected costs, sacrifice goals of punitive damages).
287. See, e.g., Clements, supra note 268, at 218; Toy, supra note 286, at
335; Demarest & Jones, supra note 286, at 825 n.156 (criticizing arbitrariness
of caps).
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deterrent function of punitive damages because the total punitive
liability is predictable.
B. Compulsory State Sharing of Punitive Damage Awards
Recently, California's governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, signed
a bill requiring plaintiffs to remit 75% of each punitive damages
award to the state treasury. 28 8 This makes California the ninth state
to require plaintiffs to share a portion of their punitive damages
awards with the state. The others are Alaska, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah. 289 The Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that it could apportion a punitive damages award in an
insurance bad faith case between the plaintiff and a state agency.
290
In Alaska, the court requires that half of every punitive damages
award be "deposited into the general fund of the state."291 The
Georgia state-sharing statute provided that "seventy-five percent of
any amounts awarded [for punitive damages in products liability
actions] shall be paid into the treasury of the state through the Fiscal
Division of the Department of Administrative Services." 292  In
288. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1997); Governor Signs Bill Adopting
Court Budget Reform, Giving State Share of Punitive Damages,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE Aug. 18, 2004, at 1, [hereinafter Governor
Signs Bill] at http://www.metnews.com; see generally Catherine M. Sharkey,
Governor Schwarzenegger Pumps Up Tort Reform: Should California Get
Seventy-Five Percent of Plaintiffs' Punitive Damages Awards?, June 3, 2004,
FINDLAW'S LEGAL COMMENTARY, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/
20040603_sharkey.html.
289. For an exhaustive survey of split-recovery statutes, see Catherine
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 375-80
(2003) (summarizing split-share tort reforms).
290. The court ruled that assigning a portion of a $49 million punitive
damages award was an appropriate judicial action. Dardinger v. Anthem Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146 (Ohio 2002) (apportioning $10
million to the plaintiff and the remaining portion to the James Cancer Hospital
and Solove Research Institute at the Ohio State University).
291. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0206) (Michie Supp. 2003).
292. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e)(2) (West 2003). Georgia's state-sharing
statute which requires payment of 75% of punitive damages in products
liability to the state was found to be unconstitutional by a federal judge in
McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1579 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(holding that Georgia's split recovery statute violated due process, equal
protection and the excessive fines clauses of the U.S. and Georgia's state
constitution). However, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld split-recovery in
1350
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Georgia, the state has standing as a judgment creditor until the
judgment is satisfied.293 Georgia is typical in enacting compulsory
apportionment without careful study. A federal judge observed that
Georgia's split recovery statute was enacted "with no studies or
documentation" whatsoever supporting the assertion that
apportionment was necessary to protect Georgia's economy.
294
Punitive damages in Georgia products liability cases were rarely
awarded and were modest in size.29 5 Illinois gives the trial judge the
discretion to apportion punitive damages between the plaintiff and
the State of Illinois Department of Human Services.2 9 6
Indiana's split-recovery statute has been found to be
constitutional.2 9 7 In Iowa, if the defendant's conduct is directed
specifically at the claimant, the full amount of the punitive damage
award is paid to the claimant. Otherwise, the plaintiff may receive a
limit of a quarter of punitive damages with the rest remitted to the
298state. Indiana requires the defendant to remit all punitive damages
to the court clerk, who allocates 75% to the state treasurer and 25%
to the plaintiff.299 Missouri allocates 50% of punitive damages after
attorney fees and legal expenses are allocated. Oregon enacted an
Mack Trucks Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 640 (Ga. 1993).
293. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (e)(2) (West 2003).
294. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569.
295. I uncovered a total of ten punitive damages awards in Georgia products
liability cases in twenty-five year period (1965-1990). Georgia averaged only
a single punitive damages award every two-and-a-half years. Yet, the
legislature capped punitive damages and allocated 75% of each award to the
state treasury based upon anecdotal evidence of a Georgia litigation crisis
inimical to the interests of the business community. The only two awards
greater than $500,000 were against Fortune 500 companies, Eli Lilly and Ford
Motor. The Georgia data was part of the dataset reported in Michael Rustad,
In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes
with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1, 29 (1992).
296. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 2003).
297. Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 470 (id. 2003) (upholding
constitutionality of Indiana's allocation statute as it did not exact a taking of
private property nor require attorneys to undertake such representation).
298. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A. I (West 1998). The state-sharing of punitive
damages was upheld in Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue
&Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991).
299. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6(b) (Michie 1998).
300. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (West Supp. 2004).
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apportionment statute in response to a litigation crisis30 1 that requires
prevailing plaintiffs to remit half of every punitive damages award to
the State.302 Utah requires the plaintiff to remit half of all punitive
damages in excess of $20,000 to the state treasury.
30 3
Apportionment statutes have been enacted but repealed in
Colorado, Kansas, New York, and Florida. 30 4 Kansas repealed its
split-recovery statute that allocated half of all punitive damages
awarded in medical malpractice cases to the state.30 5 Colorado's split-
301. In Oregon, attorneys' fees of the plaintiff are paid out of the punitive
damages, with half of the remainder going to the plaintiff and the other half to
the state. The empirical evidence reveals that Oregon was a punitive damages
cold-spot. In the twenty-five year period between 1965 and 1990, Oregon
juries handed down a total of two punitive damages awards in all products
liability actions. The size of the average punitive damages award in a products
case in Oregon is less than one-half the size than the national mean (only
46.12% of national mean). Although during the 25-year period covered an
average of 1.16% of the nation's population lived in Oregon, juries in that state
awarded less than one-quarter of that percentage in punitive damages during
the 25 years surveyed, that is, only 0.27% of the total punitive damages
awarded nationwide in products liability cases from 1965 through 1990 (less
than one-quarter of the expected rate). Of the 45 states that allow punitive
damages, awards, Oregon ranked in the bottom one-half in both total awards
(ranking 29th) and per capita awards (ranking 24th). The amount of punitive
damages awarded per capita in Oregon is less than one-quarter of the amount
awarded nationwide ($1.47 per capita in Oregon for the 25-year period
surveyed and only $0.06 per capita per year, compared to $6.36 per capita for
the United States for the same 25-year period or $0.25 per capita per year
nationwide). The data do not support the need for a split-recovery statute.
These empirical findings are reported in an empirical study I completed for my
amicus brief in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in Support of Respondent,
Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (No. 93-644).
302. OR. REV. STAT § 31.735 (2003).
303. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (Supp. 2004) ("In any case where punitive
damages are awarded, the judgment shall provide that 50% of the amount of
the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after an allowable deduction
for the payment of attorneys fees and costs, be remitted by the judgment debtor
to the state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.").
304. Florida's split-recovery statute divided punitive damages 65% to the
plaintiff and 35% to one of two state funds. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)
(West 1997) (repealed July 1, 1995). New York, too, adopted a state sharing
of punitive damages for the period 1992-95 but let the statute expire. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 8701 (McKinney 1981), repealed by 1992 N.Y. Laws c. 55,
§ 427(dd), eff. April 1, 1994.
305. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1994) (allocating 50% of medical
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recovery statute was repealed after a court found that it violated
Colorado's state constitution and the U.S. Constitution.30 6 In 1991,
the Colorado Supreme Court struck down the split-recovery statute
ruling that it violated the federal and state constitutional provisions
against the taking of private property without just compensation.
30 7
Florida enacted a state-sharing scheme that allocated 60% of
punitive damage awards to the Public Medical Assistance Trust
Fund 30 8 where the wrongdoing arose out of personal injury or
wrongful death.3°9 Florida's statue, which divided punitive damages
40% to the plaintiff and 60% to one of two state funds, was found to
be rationally related to the objectives of state tort reform.310  The
Supreme Court of Florida upheld a statute providing that 60% of
punitive damages should be allocated to the state.311 Iowa upheld its
state-sharing provision rejecting the plaintiff's argument that he had
a "property right" in punitive damages. 3 12 A Utah trial district court
recently declared that Utah's split-recovery statute is unconstitutional
on the grounds that it constitutes an impermissible taking of property
of the claimant.
313
There is no empirical research on the impact of split-recovery
statutes. The evidence shows, however, that such split-recovery
statutes may not help the states as much as had been assumed. For
example, the state of New York received only $15,000 from punitive
damages judgments in all substantive areas of law in the three years
during which it had an apportionment statute.
314
malpractice punitive damages to the state); id. § 60-3402(g) (in force for all
causes of action accruing after July 1, 1985, but before July 1, 1988).
306. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (repealed 1995).
307. Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 272 (Colo. 1991).
308. Florida's state-sharing was upheld in Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800,
802 (Fla. 1992).
309. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West 1986) (expired 1990) ("60
percent of the [punitive] award shall be payable to the Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund" in personal injury or wrongful death cases).
310. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802.
311. Id. at 801.
312. Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., 473
N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991).
313. Linda Thomson, Utah 's Split-Recovery Law Declared Unconstitutional,
DESERT MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City), June 12, 2004, at Al.
314. The state legislature assumed that the 1992 split/share statute would
result in sizable revenue. Gary Spencer, Punitive Damages Tax Yields Little
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Split-recovery schemes reduce the incentive to underwrite cases
where the harm to society is high, and where the probability of
success may be indeterminate. 3 15 State sharing could well result in a
long-term financial drain because states will be forced to undertake
expensive investigations currently performed by private attorneys
general.316 Split recovery reduced the necessary incentives to
conduct discovery and underwrite the considerable litigation
expenses when filing actions against international corporations.
317
To date, there is no empirical study of how split-recovery of punitive
damages works in practice. New York318 and Florida319 enacted
apportionment statutes with sunset provisions and have let these
So Far, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 5, 1992, at I (arguing that the low yield of New York's
split recovery statute suggests that there is a perverse incentive to structure
post-verdict settlements to eliminate the punitive component). However, the
state received only four orders or judgments awarding punitive damages in the
first ten months of its effective date. Id. If the full amount of the awards
survived appeal, New York would collect only $15,000 from its share of
punitive damages in all substantive areas of the law. Id.
315. Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., The Case for Punitive Damages (Including
Their Coverage by Liability Insurance), 35 ATLA L.J. 164, 171 (1974) ("The
self-interest 'windfall' of punitive damages thus provides the motive power to
induce plaintiffs to bring suits that would otherwise not be brought.").
316. No empirical study has been conducted to study the impact of
obligatory apportionment statutes that have been enacted to date. There is not a
scintilla of evidence that split-recovery statutes protect the viability of the
business community.
317. In the late 1980s, I interviewed plaintiff's attorneys who were
successful in obtaining punitive damages in products liability litigation. The
range of expenditures was $10,000 to $1,500,000 and this did not include the
lost opportunity costs as well as the attorneys' time. See MICHAEL RUSTAD,
DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A
SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS 4-15 (Lee H. Romano
1991) (reporting data from interviews with trial lawyers). It is likely that the
expenditures would be much greater today. Split-recovery makes it more
unattractive to bring lawsuits, however worthy, against large corporations.
When punitive damages are at issue, there is generally a wide array of
constitutional, procedural, and evidentiary objections raised at every stage of
the litigation process. It is hypothesized that state-sharing statutes alter the
incentives resulting in a reduction of claims.
318. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 8701 (McKinney 1981), repealed by, 1992 N.Y. Laws c.
55, § 427(dd), eff. April 1, 1994, was enacted with a sunset provision that was
not renewed.
319. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (West 1986) is a provision that is no
longer operative under Florida's punitive damages statute.
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provisions expire. Alabama has a poison pill against sharing
punitive damages with the state or a state agency: "No portion of a
punitive damage award shall be allocated to the state or any agency
or department of the state."
320
C. Statutory Safe Harbors for Punitive Damages
A few jurisdictions immunize the manufacturers or sellers of
drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Arizona (1989),321 Colorado (1991),322 New Jersey (1987),323 Ohio
(1987), 324 Oregon (1987),325 North Dakota (1995),326 and Utah
(1989) 327 enacted tort reform statutes that held that drug
manufacturers were not liable for punitive damages so long as they
complied with the relevant FDA regulations during the approval
process. These statutes provide for an exception if the manufacturer
or seller has fraudulently withheld or misrepresented material
information from the agency. 328 The rationale for a government
compliance defense is that compliance with an agency's approval
process is inconsistent with the punitive damages standard of
reckless indifference to the public. The problem, of course, is that
the pharmaceutical company is the first to know of a profile of
developing danger that occurs after approval. A company can also
320. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(1) (Supp. 2003).
321. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (West 2003) (precluding punitive
damages for approved drug except if manufacturer or seller knowingly
withholds or misrepresents information to the FDA).
322. COLo REV. STAT. § 13-64-302.5(5)(a) (2001).
323. New Jersey provides that compliance with FDA-approved warnings is
presumptively adequate. Punitive damages are not available if pharmaceutical
products are approved by the FDA. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West
2000).
324. 2004 Ohio Laws 144 (effective Apr. 7, 2005) (stating that a government
standard defense for FDA approved drugs with an exception for a seller or
manufacturer's withholding of material information or fraudulent
misrepresentations to the federal agency).
325. Under Oregon's statute, punitive damages may not be assessed against
pharmaceutical manufacturers if the drug was manufactured or labeled in
conformity with the Federal FDA regulations, or generally is recognized as
safe and effective pursuant to FDA regulations. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927
(2003).
326. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(6) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003).
327. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (2002).
328. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(B) (West 2003).
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selectively submit and present studies to the FDA in a favorable light
that misleads regulators, but does not amount to fraud.
The FDA defense is designed to insulate the pharmaceutical
industry or manufacturers of medical products and devices from
liability for punitive damages.329 The rationale for an FDA "safe
harbor" is that immunity will reduce product liability exposure, thus
lowering the cost of insurance and encouraging the development of
new drugs and devices. 330 The reformers also maintain that the FDA
defense would "improve the climate for innovation in medical
technology." 331 Courts have sometimes interpreted the FDA defense
to preclude compensatory as well as punitive damages.
332
The FDA defense to punitive damages has an unanticipated
negative impact on women judging from mass tort litigation in recent
years. Many of the drugs and medical products that have been the
subject of mass tort actions are products or devices used only (or
disproportionately) by women: intrauterine contraceptives, 333 breast
implants, 334 pharmaceutical products,
335 and medical devices.
336
329. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical
Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance
Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1438, 1454 (1994).
330. "The FDA defense would certainly sharply curtail the amount of
exposure, and that would probably bring the insurance companies back into the
picture." Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack
on Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 673,
745 n.342 (1996) (citing The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, Transcript #3823
(July 25, 1990) (statement by George Frazza, counsel for Johnson and
Johnson)).
331. Lack of a Life Saving Medical Device, Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Reg. and Gov't Info. of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1993) (statement of James S. Benson, Senior Vice President Health
Industry Manufacturer's Association); see also Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard F.
Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Punitive Damage Awards on
Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 FOOD DRUG COSMETICS
L.J. 693, 695 (1990).
332. Several courts have held that FDA approval should insulate a firm from
actual damages as well as punitive damages. See, e.g., Stamps v. Collagen
Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1424 (5th Cir. 1993) and King v. Collagen Corp., 983
F.2d 1130, 1132-37 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that pre-market FDA approval of
collagen preempts all tort remedies).
333. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987); In re
A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
334. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F.
Supp. 1098, 1099-1100 (J.P.M.L. 1992).
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These mass torts affecting women feature injuries from defective
products placed inside their bodies, whereas men are seldom injured
in this fashion.
Another recent example of the gender injustice of the FDA
Defense is the mass tort disaster caused by the marketing of the diet
combination drug known as Fen-Phen. 337 Three hundred thousand
plaintiffs, mostly women, filed suits against Wyeth by the year
2000. 3" The Fen-Phen tragedy illustrates the potential problem of
immunizing manufacturers who have complied with FDA standards
but knowingly endanger the consuming public. In the Fen-Phen
cases, the companies complied with FDA regulations but failed to
take prompt remedial actions in the face of a developing profile of
danger.
339
D. Limits on Multiple Punishment for the Same Conduct
The multiple punishment problem occurs when a defendant is
repeatedly assessed punitive damages for the same defective product
or course of conduct. 34 In toxic torts or mass torts cases, there may
be millions of potential victims. The asbestos punitive damages
awards were based upon an entire industry's cover-up of the then
known dangers of unprotected exposure. 341 In the Dalkon Shield
products liability litigation, for example, A.H. Robins Co. executives
had concealed evidence that its IUDS were defective. 342 Thousands
335. See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 03-2025, 03-2063,
03-2072, 2004 WL 2,220,322 (3d Cir. Oct. 5, 2004).
336. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987); In re
A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
337. See generally ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE
VICTIMS, THE DRUG COMPANIES, AND THE DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE
BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN (2001) (arguing that the pharmaceutical industry's
undue influence on the FDA resulted in the diet drug being kept on the market
long after a profile of developing danger was detected).
338. Id. at 386.
339. Id. at 24-27.
340. Edward F. Sherman, Introduction to the Symposium: Complex
Litigation: Plagued by Concerns Over Federalism, Jurisdiction and Fairness,
37 AKRON L. REV. 589, 601 (2004) (referring to multiple punishment problem
as "punitive damages overkill").
341. See, e.g., Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35,
46 (Tex. 1998).
342. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1237 (Kan. 1987).
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of women suffered preventable life-threatening or even fatal illnesses
from the same course of conduct.343 The firm filed for bankruptcy
facing thousands of potential punitive damages awards.
344
A few jurisdictions place limits on the number of punitive
damages for the same act or course of conduct. Florida, for example,
precludes the awarding of punitive damages against a defendant if it
can be established that there was a previous award "in any state or
federal court in any action alleging harm from the same act or single
course of conduct for which the claimant seeks compensatory
damages." 345 For purposes of a civil action, the term "the same act
or single course of conduct" includes acts resulting in the same
manufacturing defects, acts resulting in the same defects in design, or
failure to warn of the same hazards, with respect to similar units of a
343. See id.
344. Punitive damages in mass torts litigation present the greatest risk of
strategic bankruptcy to avoid punitive damages liability. Asbestos cases were
not the only mass torts that resulted in plaintiffs not collecting punitive
damages due to bankruptcy. Several plaintiffs in the Dalkon Shield cases did
not collect their punitive damage awards due to A.H. Robins' Chapter 11
reorganization. Georgene Vairo, Mass Tort Bankruptcies: The Who, the Why
and the How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 117 (2004) (noting reorganization plan
resulted in elimination of punitive damages). The reorganization plan funded a
trust for the nearly 200,000 victims that provided compensation, which
was a tiny fraction of actual damages which would be collected in full-scale
trials. See id. at 114 (noting approximately 197,000 claims remained under
reorganization plan). As with the asbestos manufacturers, A.H. Robins was
not driven into bankruptcy by punitive damage awards. Only 11 plaintiffs
were awarded punitive damages. See id. at 111-21. It was the thousands of
compensatory awards and potential liability that motivated A.H. Robins to file
for bankruptcy. See id.; In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
345. Florida statute section 768.73(2)(a) provides:
Except as provided in paragraph (b), punitive damages may not be
awarded against a defendant in a civil action if that defendant
establishes, before trial, that punitive damages have previously been
awarded against that defendant in any state or federal court in any
action alleging harm from the same act or single course of conduct for
which the claimant seeks compensatory damages. For purposes of a
civil action, the term 'the same act or single course of conduct'
includes acts resulting in the same manufacturing defects, acts
resulting in the same defects in design, or failure to warn of the same
hazards, WITH RESPECT TO SIMILAR UNITS OF A PRODUCT.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a) (West Supp. 2004).
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product.346  A federal court struck down Georgia's tort reform
provision limiting punitive damages in products liability cases to one
award irrespective of the number of plaintiffs or causes of action.
347
Missouri348 and Montana 349 give the trial judge the discretion to
reduce punitive damages awards after considering evidence of prior
awards.
Restricting punitive damages to the first plaintiff is arbitrary and
may create the perverse incentive of encouraging frivolous lawsuits
in the race to the courthouse. Discriminating among categories of
plaintiffs is arbitrary and difficult to do. Limiting multiple punitive
damages awards to the first comer creates a lottery-like atmosphere
in which the first claimant wins punitive damages, precluding claims
by other plaintiffs.
Punitive damages tort reform is perhaps the most successful
legal reform movement in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Table
Two depicts the tort reforms of punitive damages by the numbers.
Bear in mind that most reforms have been enacted in the past decade.
The aggregate effect of punitive damages reform is, in effect, the
closing of punitive damages' iron cage. The closing of the door on
jury discretion threatens the continued vitality of punitive damages
as a viable legal institution. The next section addresses the U.S.
Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence, which applies to
every state.
346. Id.
347. McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(holding that the Georgia tort reform discriminated among plaintiffs and
violated state and federal equal protection).
348. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(4) (West Supp. 2004).
349. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(c) (2003).
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TABLE 2: CHECKS AND BALANCES ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES3 50
The number of states that either prohibit
punitive damages or that have enacted one 45
or more tort limitations.
The number of states that have raised the
standard of proof from a preponderance of 34
the evidence to "clear and convincing"
evidence.
The number of states that cap or limit the
amount of punitive damages or prohibit 25
recovery altogether.
The number of states that have fortified jury
instructions on punitive damages. 22
The number of states that may require
plaintiffs to share a portion of their recovery 10
with the state or a state entity.
The number of punitive damages hot spots
that have not enacted at least one punitive 1
damage reform.
The number of states with compulsory post-
verdict reviews of punitive damages awards 51
for excessiveness.
E. THE COURT'S JUDICIAL TORT REFORM
In 1994, the Court began to strike down a succession of four
large punitive awards against out-of-state corporations.35' Since
350. See infra appendix A.
351. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (vacating a multi-
million dollar punitive damages award against a Japanese manufacturer on the
grounds that Oregon did not provide for a mandated post-verdict review of the
award for excessiveness); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)
(reversing multi-million dollar award against U.S. subsidiary of German
automobile company on grounds that the award was so excessive as to violate
substantive due process); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
532 U.S. 424 (2001) (vacating large punitive damages award in trade dress
case because federal appellate court applied the wrong standard of review);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (reversing an
award of $145 million in punitive damages, where full compensatory damages
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1989, the Court has issued seven opinions, reshaping the
constitutional contours of punitive damages awarded against
corporate defendants. 352 The tort reform community single-handedly
launched a judicial tort reform movement in the U.S. Supreme Court,
urging the Court to step in to constrain runaway punitive damages in
the states. 353  Despite the unanimity of social science research
findings that there is no nationwide punitive damages crisis, 354 the
majority of the Court agrees that concerted judicial action is required
to contain excessive punitive damages awards.
355
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,356 a five to four
majority of the Court found a $2 million dollar punitive damages
were $1 million, as excessive and in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
352. (1) Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257
(1989); (2) Pac. Mut. Life Ins., Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); (3) TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); (4) Honda Motor Co.,
512 U.S. 415; (5) BMW, 517 U.S. 559; (6) Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. 424;
and (7) State Farm, 538 U.S. 408.
353. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the American Tort Reform Assoc. in Support
of Petitioner at 29, TXO, (No. 92-479); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Business
Council of Alabama in Support of Petitioner in BMW, (No. 94-896). See
generally THEODORE B. OLSON & THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES (Washington Legal Found. Legal
Backgrounder 1989).
354. Despite the controversy over punitive damages, the empirical reality is
that there is no nationwide crisis requiring radical judicial tort reform. Despite
the diversity in research methods and samples, research studies of the law-in-
action agree that there is no punitive damages crisis. Rustad, Unraveling
Punitive Damages, supra note 8, at 19; see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Damage
Awards in Perspective: Behind The Headline-Grabbing Awards in Exxon
Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129, 1134-39 (2001)
(summarizing study showing no increase in punitive damages awards between
1991 and 1996).
355. A number of U.S. Supreme Court Justices indicated their willingness to
consider a due process challenge to punitive damages prior to 1991. See, e.g.,
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion on the
understanding that it leaves the door open for a holding that the Due Process
Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil cases brought by
private parties."); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, because of the punitive
character of such awards, there is reason to think that this may violate the Due
Process Clause.").
356. 517 U.S. 559.
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award to be excessive and violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 357 The Court announced three guideposts to
determine whether exemplary damages are disproportionate to
compensatory damages: (1) "the degree of reprehensibility of the
nondisclosure;" (2) "the disparity between the harm or potential
harm... and [the] punitive damages award;" and (3) the difference
between the remedy and "the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases." 358 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc. ,359 the Court mandated the de novo standard of review
for federal appellate courts applying an excessiveness review of
punitive damages.
360
The latest U.S. Supreme Court opinion reshaping the path of
punitive damages law was handed down in April of 2003 in State
Farm Mutual Inc. v. Campbell.361 The State Farm Court struck
down a $145 million punitive damages award that was equal to fifty-
six times the compensatory damages as disproportionate to the
wrong committed by the insurer.362 The Court continued its tort
reform agenda, striking down a $145 million punitive damages
award on the grounds that it was so excessive as to violate the
insurer's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 363 A prominent insurer characterized this case as one
that could "move the nation closer to guidelines for controlling
punitive damages."
364
1. The Court's Presumptive Cap on Punitive Damages
The State Farm Court formulated a presumptive mathematical
test for reviewing the reasonableness of high ratio punitive damages
awards: "Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due
process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and
retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1, or in this
357. Id. at 585.
358. Id. at 575.
359. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
360. Id.
361. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
362. Id. at 429.
363. Id.
364. DIAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
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case, of 145 to 1.,,365 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
observed that "[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages... will satisfy due process."
366
The Court acknowledged the different functions of compensatory
and punitive damages 367 but then asserted that compensatory
damages also contain a punitive "element."
368
The punitive damages were ruled an arbitrary and
unconstitutional deprivation because the insurer's conduct failed
both the reprehensibility and the high ratio guideposts. 369 The Court
eschewed a mathematical ratio test, however, noting, "the precise
award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and
circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the
plaintiff. 3 70 The net effect of the Court's recent punitive damages
jurisprudence is to place a de facto cap on punitive damages. The
Court's presumptive cap permits exceptions for particularly
egregious conduct, but strictly scrutinizes high ratios of punitive
damages to compensatory damages.
2. The Court's New Rules of Evidence
The State Farm Court criticized the Utah trial court for engaging
in extraterritorial punishment and permitting the plaintiffs attorney
to introduce evidence that "rebuke[d] State Farm for its nationwide
activities." 371 The punitive damages issue was used "as a platform to
expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm's
operations throughout the country. '372 The Court observed that the
trial court should not have admitted evidence of State Farm's
national policies that did not have a nexus to the harm suffered by
365. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 416.
368. Id. at 426 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c
(1977)).
369. Id. at 425 (observing that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process").
370. Id.
371. Id. at 420 ("From their opening statements onward the [plaintiffs]
framed this case as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its nationwide
activities.").
372. Id.
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the plaintiff.373 The Court's limitation on the admissibility of other
bad acts conflicts with state law in which juries may be informed of
other punitive damages awarded for the same course of conduct.
3 74
The net effect is to place limitations on prosecuting corporations whose
other bad acts and out-of-state lawsuits frequently have a nexus to their
national policies.
The State Farm Court also limits the type of evidence and the
manner in which states may determine what constitutes punishment
sufficient to deter the defendant and others from repeating
misconduct. 375 There will be no shortage of future issues for the
court to ponder when it comes to punitive damages. In the State
Farm case, corporate amici urged the Court to eliminate the variable
of the defendant's wealth from the punitive damages equation.
376
The Court's skepticism about the value of a defendant's financial
condition in setting punishment is inconsistent with more than two
centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence that calibrates
punishment with wealth.377  The impact of the Court's new
evidentiary doctrine will have a chilling effect on wealth-based
punishment in all jurisdictions where that principle is well
established.
The State Farm decision is the high-water mark in judicial tort
reform and will likely have a chilling effect on punitive damages
litigation. The net effect is to federalize punitive damages by placing
nationwide limits on excessive awards. The Rehnquist Court is
unhappy with the federal preemption of state law in nearly every
substantive field of law save punitive damages. 378  The Court's
373. Id. at 422 (stating that "a jury must be instructed, furthermore, that it
may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action
that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred") (citation omitted).
374. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1979).
375. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423.
376. Brief of the American Tort Reform Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 1, State Farm, (No. 01-1289).
377. The use of wealth-based punishment sends a message of deterrence. As
the Maine Supreme Court stated, "When it is thoroughly understood that it is
not profitable to employ careless and indifferent agents, or reckless and
insolent servants, better [employees] will take their places, and not before."
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869).
378. The Rehnquist Court has struck down numerous federal statutes on the
grounds that they intruded upon the province of state law. See, e.g., United
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punitive damages jurisprudence constitutes a radical departure from
what Justice Brandeis described as "one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may... serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."
379
The U.S Supreme Court's federalization or centralization of
punitive damages undermines the role of states as laboratories of
punitive damages reform. In 2003, the business community ranked
the Court's judicial tort reform opinion in State Farm380 as the single
most important decision of the year for corporate America. 381 The
insurance industry and product manufacturers were the chief
financial beneficiaries of the Court's nationalization of punitive
damages. 382 In the wake of the State Farm case, the Court vacated
punitive damages awards awarded against a number of powerful
corporate defendants: Philip Morris, Exxon, Chrysler, Ford Motor
Company, and National Union Fire Insurance.
383
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the
authority to enact the Violence Against Women Statute because it did not
involve economic activity or interstate commerce); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress had not
identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination
by the state of Alabama sufficient to abrogate Alabama's Eleventh
Amendment immunity); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (ruling that the State of Florida was
not subject to a trademark infringement case since it did not waive its
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
379. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
380. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
381. Marcia Coyle, Business Cases Cut Wide Swath: So far, 18 of the 38
cases on the Docket Could Impact Employers, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 2003, at 5.
382. See, e.g., Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 538 U.S. 974 (2003)
(vacating punitive damages in insurance bad faith case); Anchor Hocking, Inc.
v. Waddill, 538 U.S. 974 (2003) (vacating punitive damages award in products
liability action).
383. State Farm and several of the corporate defendants who had their
punitive damages verdicts vacated are financial supporters of the tort reform
movement. See Trisha Howard, Lawyers Strike Back at Interest Groups: They
Say the Groups Who Have Criticized Donations to Judges Promote Corporate,
but Not Public Interests, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 11, 2002, at Cl
(noting that the "American Tort Reform Association counts as its primary
supporters such companies as Caterpillar, Exxon, General Electric, Philip
Morris and State Farm Insurance.").
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The $5 billion in punitive damages awarded in the Exxon
Valdez oil spill disaster was vacated,384 as was a $290 million award
against Ford Motor Co.381 and a $3 million punitive damages award
against Chrysler Corporation. 386 When it vacated a $79.5 million
punitive damages award against Phillip Morris in the wake of State
Farm, the Court handed the tobacco mogul what was in effect, a
multi-million dollar subsidy.387 Punitive damages have been slashed
by state and federal courts in a number of cases on remand from the
U.S. Supreme Court.388 Many of the corporate defendants whose
384. "On August 18, 2003, before the parties even submitted appellate
briefs, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the
case so that the district court could reconsider the [four billion dollar award] in
light of State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, decided by
the Supreme Court in April of 2003." Joseph J. Chambers, In Re Exxon
Valdez: Application of Due Process Constraints on Punitive Damages Awards,
20 ALASKA L. REv. 195, 198 (2003) (citations omitted); see Sea Hawk
Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., Nos. 30-35166, 03-32519, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18219 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003) (vacating $15 billion punitive damages
award for reprehensible conduct committed during the Exxon Valdez oil spill
in Alaska).
385.Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 538 U.S. 1028 (2003) (vacating $290 million
punitive damages awarded in products liability case involving Ford Bronco in
which three family members were killed).
386. Chrysler Corp. v. Clark, 540 U.S. 801 (2003) (vacating punitive
damages award in light of State Farm).
387. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003) (vacating
punitive damages award in light of State Farm).
388. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 34, 98
P.3d 409, 419 (Utah 2004) (remand from Supreme Court) (remitting $145
punitive damages award to $9 million which was an amount 900 times the
maximum statutory penalty). In re Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska
2004) (reducing $5 billion punitive damages award to $4.5 billion); ). Romo v.
Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, 113 Cal.App.4th 738, 806 (Ct. App. 2003)
(remitting $290 million $290 million to $23.7 million); TVT Records v. Island
Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp.2d 413, 450 (S.D. N.Y. 2003) (reducing
punitive damages to a one to one ratio with compensatory damages); Roth v.
Farner-Bocken Co., 667 N.W.2d 651, 670-71 (S.D. 2003) (remitting punitive
damages to $25,000 in an invasion of privacy case); Blust v. Lamar
Advertising Co., 157 Ohio App.3d 787, 813 N.E.2d 902, 916 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004) (reversing punitive damages in landowner's action against billboard
company for trespass and wrongful destruction of trees on the property); See,
e.g., Stogsdill v. Healthmark Partners, LLC, 377 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 2004)
(reducing punitive damages in a nursing home neglect case to a four-to-one
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punitive damages were vacated are not only amicus parties in
punitive damages jurisprudence, but also the most vocal activists for
tort reform in Congress and state legislatures.
V. CONCLUSION
Tort reformers proudly stir the pot of ignorance about the
administration of punitive damages in the states in order to
encourage state legislators to further limit this remedy. This article
has contrasted the tort reform rhetoric about punitive damages
availability with the reality that states have slammed the door on
punitive damages' iron cage. After two decades of tort reform,
jurors have far less discretion at every stage of the litigation process.
Punitive damage awards in the states have become overly
bureaucratic, hamstringing this remedy at every stage of the litigation
process. Part II of this article reviewed the general availability of
punitive damages and the various restrictions that limit their
availability. In the United States, the states are properly a laboratory
for experimentation with different views about whether punitive
damages should be recoverable, against which party, and under
which conditions. Punitive damages have been awarded for more
than two centuries to punish and deter reckless or outrageous conduct
that threatens the public safety or interest. States tailor "checks and
balances," such as restrictions on claimants and defendants, to local
conditions.
Part III examined the procedural tort reform rules relevant to the
punitive damages aspect of a trial. A preponderance of jurisdictions
has imposed new judicial controls on the recovery of punitive
damages in recent years. New pleading and discovery rules preclude
the possibility of frivolous punitive damages. Punitive damages may
not be required unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant recklessly or maliciously violated the rights of the
plaintiff. New evidentiary doctrines place restrictions on the use of
corporate wealth to set damages. Tort reforms have mandated
fortified jury instructions, standards of review, and excessiveness
ratio); Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 394 F.3d 594, 603 (8th
Cir. 2005) (holding that a $15 million punitive damages award was excessive
and reducing award to $4 million).
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reviews for punitive damages. This remedy has been cabined,
cornered, and subjected to judicial control at every stage.
Part IV surveyed the substantive limits on punitive damages
enacted to prevent excessive awards. Capping the level of punitive
damages is the fastest growing tort reform. Caps not only reduce
deterrence, but they also leave little room for autonomous jury
decisions. This audit of tort reforms demonstrates that the legal
environment for punitive damages is not overly favorable to
plaintiffs, and arguably is not even fair to them. The U.S. Supreme
Court in the recent State Farm case expressed concern "over the
imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are
administered. 3 89 Vice President Dick Cheney recently stated that
"he and President Bush have a plan to fix [our medical liability
litigation system] by, among other things, capping punitive damages
in malpractice cases at $250,000.,,39 0 Before the Court or Congress
further restricts plaintiffs' rights to an important remedy, it is
incumbent upon legislators to review the judicial control over
punitive damages already in place.
The backlash against punitive damages is one of the most
extensive "law reform" movements in Anglo-American history.
Appendix A documents that punitive damages reforms constitute
special interest legislation in disguise. Tort reform in the states is a
victory of the "haves" over the "have-nots" achieved through a
disinformation campaign whose watchword is tort reform. 391 Legal
historians will surely agree that the past two decades of punitive
damages jurisprudence have belonged to the corporate defense. It is
no exaggeration to say that there has been a quiet revolution, which
has revamped punitive damages in all but a few states.392 Although
389. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003).
390. Joe Hallet, Edwards Hurts Doctors, Patients, Cheney Says, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (Ohio), July 20, 2004, at 4A.
391. The tort reform of punitive damages is part of a "skillfully organized
and well-financed movement to sharply limit key tort rights and remedies such
as punitive damages, modified duty, non-economic damages, multiple
causation, joint and several liability, products liability and strict liability. Neo-
conservative legal consciousness is bringing us "back to the future" by
resurrecting the defenses, privileges, immunities and liability-limiting
doctrines of an earlier era." Rustad & Koenig, supra note 8, at 4.
392. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 8 app., at 88-90 (listing punitive
damages reforms by state). Since 1993, the pace of punitive damages
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there is little legislative history for state tort reforms, the states have
often enacted punitive damages reforms in hopes of stimulating the
local economy. The last few decades have witnessed a closing of
punitive damages' iron cage. The danger of an overly bureaucratic
iron cage is that this remedy will no longer be flexible enough to
accommodate the dangers of the twenty-first century.
limitations has accelerated. See infra appendix A (documenting the enactment
of numerous tort reforms limiting punitive damages).
Spring 2005] 1369
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1297
APPENDIX A: A FIFTY-ONE JURISDICTION SURVEY OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ALABAMA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
"Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action,
except civil actions for wrongful death.., other than in a tort action
where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud,
wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." '393 Punitive
damages are awarded to punish the defendant 394 and for both specific
and general deterrence. 395 Punitive damages rest upon "a theory of
punishment for wrongful conduct and [serve] as a warning to
others .... " 396  Punitive damages should exceed the defendant's
profit or gain from its wrongful activity.
397
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
In Alabama punitive damages require clear and convincing
evidence, defined as "[e]vidence that, when weighed against
evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a
firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high
probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." 398 This
restriction does not apply to civil actions for wrongful death.399
393. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a), (b)(l)-(3), (5) (1993).
394. See, e.g., Marigold Coal, Inc. v. Thames, 149 So. 2d 276, 280 (Ala.
1962).
395. See Associates Fin. Servs. Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Barbour, 592 So. 2d 191,
199 (Ala. 1992).
396. Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Dinsmore, 144 So. 21, 23 (Ala. 1932).
397. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 624 (Ala. 1994).
398. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(b)(4) (1993).
399. Id. § 6-5-410.
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2. Capped Punitive Damages
Alabama caps punitive damages in non-physical injury cases to
the greater of three times compensatory damages or $500,000. For
small businesses with a net worth less than $2 million, the punitive
damages are capped at $50,000 or 10% of net worth up to $2 million.
In physical injury cases, punitive damages are limited to the greater
of three times compensatory damages or $1.5 million.400  Alabama
400. Alabama code section 6-11-21 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b), (d), and (j), in all civil
actions where an entitlement to punitive damages shall have been
established under applicable laws, no award of punitive damages shall
exceed three times the compensatory damages of the party claiming
punitive damages or five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000),
whichever is greater.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) and (j), in all civil actions
where entitlement to punitive damages shall have been established
under applicable law against a defendant who is a small business, no
award of punitive damages shall exceed fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) or 10 percent of the business' net worth, whichever is
greater.
(c) "Small business" for purposes of this section means a business
having a net worth of two million dollars ($2,000,000) or less at the
time of the occurrence made the basis of the suit.
(d) Except as provided in subsection (j), in all civil actions for
physical injury wherein entitlement to punitive damages shall have
been established under applicable laws, no award of punitive damages
shall exceed three times the compensatory damages of the party
claiming punitive damages or one million five hundred thousand
dollars ($1,500,000), whichever is greater.
(e) Except as provided in Section 6-11-27, no defendant shall be liable
for any punitive damages unless that defendant has been expressly
found by the trier of fact to have engaged in conduct, as defined in
Section 6-11-20, warranting punitive damages, and such defendant
shall be liable only for punitive damages commensurate with that
defendant's own conduct.
(f) As to all the fixed sums for punitive damage limitations set out
herein in subsections (a), (b), and (d), those sums shall be adjusted as
of January 1, 2003, and as of January 1 at three-year intervals
thereafter, at an annual rate in accordance with the Consumer Price
Index rate.
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excludes wrongful death actions from the impact of tort reform
statutes.4°'
ALASKA
A. Standard of Liability & Functions of Punitive Damages
Alaska plaintiffs may recover punitive damages when the
defendant's conduct is "outrageous"' or "evidenced reckless
indifference to the interest of another person. 40 2 Alaska imposes
punitive damages for the purposes of punishment, specific
deterrence, and general deterrence. 403 Alaskan punitive damages are
recoverable where the wrongdoer's conduct "could fairly be
categorized as 'outrageous, such as acts done with malice or bad
motives or reckless indifference to the interests of another.'" 40 4 Malice
is defined by Alaskan courts as "a callous disregard for the rights of
others.
40 5
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Punitive damages require "clear and convincing evidence" that
the conduct of the defendant's conduct "was outrageous, including
acts done with malice or bad motives; or evidenced reckless
indifference to the interest of another person." 40 6
2. Bifurcation
Alaska requires a separate proceeding to determine the amount
of punitive damages that must be determined by statutorily
Id. § 6-11-21 (Supp. 2004).
401. See Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 382-83 (Ala.
1989).
402. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (Michie Supp. 2003).
403. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska
1992). Punitive damages serve to "punish the wrongdoer and to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from repeating the offensive act." Id.; see also
Providence Wash. Ins. Co. of Alaska v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863
(Alaska 1984).
404. Weiford, 831 P.2d at 1266.
405. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. O'Kelley, 645 P.2d 767, 774 (Alaska 1982).
406. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (Michie Supp. 2003).
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determined standards. 40 7  At the conclusion of the separate
proceeding, the fact finder must determine the amount of punitive
damages to award.40 8
3. Limitations on the Discovery of Evidence Relevant
to Punitive Damages
"Discovery of evidence... relevant to... punitive damages
may not be conducted until after the fact finder has determined that
an award of punitive damages is allowed ....
4. Capped Punitive Damages
In general, punitive damages may not exceed the greater of three
times the compensatory damages or $500,000. If the fact finder
determines, however, that the defendant was motivated by financial
gain and that the defendant or a responsible policy maker knew the
consequences of the defendant's misconduct, the cap is increased to
the greatest of: (1) four times compensatory damages; (2) four times
the aggregate amount of financial gain; or (3) seven million
dollars. 4  In employment cases, the cap ranges from $200,000 to
$500,000 depending upon the number of employees.41'
5. Split Recovery or State Sharing
"If a person receives an award of punitive damages, the court
shall require that 50 percent of the award be deposited into the
general fund of the state. This subsection does not grant the state the
right to file or join a civil action to recover punitive damages."
412
6. Corporate Punitive Liability
Alaska does not permit punitive damages to be imposed
vicariously, subject to narrow exceptions.413
407. Id. § 09.17.020(c)(1)-(7) (mandating factors the fact finder may
consider in setting the amount of punitive damages).
408. See id.
409. Id. § 09.17.020(e).
410. Id. § 09.17.020(f).
411. Id. § 09.17.020(h).
412. Id. § 09.17.0200).
413. See id. § 09.17.020(k).
Spring 2005] 1373
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:1297
ARIZONA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are recoverable in Arizona if the plaintiff can
prove that the defendant manufacturer acted with an "evil mind" or
consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a
substantial risk of significant harm.41 4  Punitive damages are also
recoverable for "outrageous conduct.. . done with bad motive or with
a reckless indifference to the interest of others. ' 415 Arizona punitive
damages are awarded to punish wrongdoers, and for general and
specific deterrence.
416
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. FDA Defense to Punitive Damages
Arizona immunizes drug manufacturers from punitive liability so
long as they comply with Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
standards.4 17 In addition, a manufacturer or seller is not liable for
punitive damages if the product is generally regarded as "safe and
effective.,,418 The FDA Defense is inapplicable if the plaintiff proves
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly
withheld or misrepresented information to the FDA.419
2. Limitations on the Admissibility of Evidence to
Prove Punitive Damages
Arizona prevents plaintiffs in products liability litigation from
using a product safety audit or review or reasonable remedial measures
to prove punitive damages.
420
414. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1080 (Ariz. 1987).
415. Smith v. Chapman, 564 P.2d 900, 903 (Ariz. 1977).
416. See Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 679 (Ariz.
1986); Hawkins, 733 P.2d at 1080.
417. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(A)(1) (West 2003).
418. Id. § 12-701(A)(2).
419. Id. § 12-701(B).
420. Id. § 12-687.
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ARKANSAS
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The standard for Arkansas punitive liability is "malice, willfulness
or wanton disregard for the rights and safety of others. ' '421 The purpose
of Arkansas punitive damages is to "impose a monetary penalty on the
defendant and to discourage others from similar behavior.' 422 Punitive
damages are intended to punish the defendant, not to compensate the
plaintiff.
423
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
In Arkansas, a plaintiff must satisfy the burden of proof for
424
punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Capped Punitive Damages
Arkansas caps punitive damages at the greater of the following:
(a)
(1) Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); or
(2) Three times the amount of compensatory damages
awarded in the action, not to exceed one million
dollars.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply when the fact finder:
(1) Determines by clear and convincing evidence that,
at the time of the injury, the defendant intentionally
pursued a course of conduct for the purpose of causing
injury or damage; and
(2) Determines that the defendant's conduct did, in
fact, harm the plaintiff.
(c) With respect to the punitive damages limitations in
subsection (a) the fixed sums of $250,000 and $1,000,000
421. Freeman v. Anderson, 651 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Ark. 1983).
422. Vickery v. Ballentine, 732 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Ark. 1987).
423. Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 352 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Ark. 1961).
424. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-206(1)(a) (Michie Supp. 2003); id. § 16-55-
207.
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will be adjusted as of January 1, 2006, and every three years
afterwards, in accordance with the Consumer Price Index
rate for the previous year.425
3. Bifurcation
In Arkansas, either party may request bifurcation.426
CALIFORNIA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In California, punitive damages are intended to punish the
offender and to deter others from committing similar wrongs of
oppression, fraud, or malice.427 The punitive damages statute states
that California punitive damages are "for the sake of example and by
way of punishing the defendant.428 Punitive damages are proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of fraud,
malice, or oppression.429
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Punitive damages must be supported by "clear and convincing"
evidence of fraud, malice, or oppression.43 °
2. Bifurcation
Defendants may request bifurcation of the punitive damages
stage from the compensatory damages phase of the trial. During the
second phase of the trial, evidence of the defendant's wealth is
presented.431  Evidence of the defendant's wealth may not be
introduced until after a verdict for actual damages and a finding that the
425. Id. § 16-55-208 (limitations on the amount of punitive damages).
426. Id. § 16-55-211(a)(1).
427. See Wetlands Water Dist. v. Amoco Chems. Co., 953 F.2d 1109, 1116
(9th Cir. 1992).
428. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997).
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. See id. § 3295(d).
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defendant is guilty of "malice, oppression or fraud. ' ' 32
3. State Sharing
California enacted SB 1102, which provides that 75% of all
punitive damages be remitted to the state treasury. This bill applies
to cases filed after the bill becomes law and the "Governor's Office
files it with the secretary of state and [it is] settled or adjudicated by
the sunset date of June 30, 2006. ' ' 43
COLORADO
A. The Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Exemplary damages in Colorado are awarded in "circumstances
of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct.434 "Wanton and
reckless conduct" is a sufficient predicate for exemplary damages.435
Exemplary or punitive damages are not compensatory in nature but
are for the purpose of the punishment of wrongdoer as an example to
others.
436
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Exemplary Damages Must Be Proven Beyond
a Reasonable Doubt
In 1986, as part of tort-reform legislation, the Colorado General
Assembly modified the preexisting statutory scheme for exemplary
damages.437 Colorado now permits exemplary damages to be
awarded provided they are supported by an evidentiary foundation
proved "beyond a reasonable doubt.,
4 38
432. Id.
433. Governor Signs Bill, supra note 288.
434. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2001).
435. Miller v. Solaglas Cal., Inc., 870 P.2d 559, 568 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
436. Exemplary damages are calculated to punish wrongful conduct and to
deter a repetition of that conduct. An award of punitive damages "is such as to
adequately impress upon defendant and others the seriousness and harmful
consequences of a particular form of misconduct." Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 220 (Colo. 1984).
437. Corbetta v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 P.2d 718, 721 (Colo. 1999).
438. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-102, 13-21-127 (2001).
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2. Standard Defined by Statute
In all civil actions in which damages are assessed by a jury for a
wrong done to the person or to personal or real property, and the
injury complained of is attended by circumstances of fraud, malice,
or willful and wanton conduct, the jury, in addition to the actual
damages sustained by this person, may award the person reasonable
exemplary damages.
439
The standards for awarding exemplary damages and the amount
of exemplary damages are also specified by statute.
440
3. Tort Reform for Standard of Review
Colorado permits a trial judge to reduce or eliminate exemplary
damages if "(a) The deterrent effect of the damages has been
accomplished; or (b) The conduct, which resulted in the award, has
ceased; or (c) The purpose of such damages has otherwise been
served."441
4. Capped Exemplary Damages
The amount of reasonable exemplary damages "shall not exceed
an amount which is equal to the amount of the actual damages
awarded to the injured party."
442
5. FDA Defense
No exemplary damages are imposed that were the result of the
use of any drug or product approved for use by any state or federal
regulatory agency that was used within the approved standards of
that agency, or used in accordance with the standards of prudent
health care professionals.
443
439. Id. § 13-21-102(1)(a)-(b).
440. Id. §§ 13-21-102, 13-25-127(2).
441. Id. § 13-21-102(2)(a)-(c).
442. Id. § 13-21-102(a).
443. Id. § 13-64-302.5(5)(a).
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CONNECTICUT
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The purpose of punitive damages in Connecticut is not to punish
or deter, but to provide a form of extra compensation.444 The sole
purpose of punitive damages is to compensate the plaintiff for litigation
expenses.44 Punitive damages are available only when the defendant
has shown reckless indifference to the rights of others, or has behaved
intentionally and in wanton violation of those rights.
446
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Caps on Punitive Damages
Punitive damages "are restricted to [the] cost of litigation less
taxable costs of the action being tried and not that of any former
trial."" 7 In products liability actions, punitive damages are capped at
two times compensatory damages. 448  In motor vehicle cases,
punitive damages are limited to two to three times the compensatory
damages.
449
2. Judge-Assessed Punitive Damages
In Connecticut, the trier of fact determines whether punitive
damages should be awarded, and the trial judge determines the
amount of the award, subject to the caps noted above.450  These
limitations apply to products liability cases, and in other substantive
444. See, e.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 692-93 (Conn. 1930);
DeSantis v. Piccadilly Land Corp., 487 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Conn. App. Ct.
1985) (stating compensatory function of punitive damages).
445. Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn.
1966); see also Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 435 (Conn. 1992).
446. Gargano v. Heyman, 525 A.2d 1343, 1347 (Conn. 1987).
447. Alaimo v. Royer, 448 A.2d 207, 209-10 (Conn. 1982) (quoting
Vandersluis v. Weil, 407 A.2d 982, 986 (Conn. 1978) (citations omitted)).
This cap was judicially recognized very early on in Connecticut's history. See,
e.g., Doroska v. Lavine, 150 A. 692, 693 (1934); Hassett v. Carroll, 81 A.
1013, 1020 (1911).
448. CoNN. GEN. STAT. 552-240(b) (2004).
449. Id. § 14-295 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
450. Id. § 52-240b (West 1991).
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fields the trial judge awards punitive damages based upon proof of
litigation expenses.
451
3. Bifurcation
In Connecticut punitive damages cases, the trier of fact
determines whether punitive damages are awarded in the first stage
of the trial, and the judge sets the amount of punitive damages in the
second.452 After the trier of fact determines that punitive damages
should be awarded, the court "determine[s] the amount of such
damages not to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages
awarded to the plaintiff.
4 53
DELAWARE
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are awarded if there is proof of the defendant's
evil motive or conscious indifference to the rights of others.4 54 The
standard for punitive damages in medical malpractice actions is
malicious intent, or willful or wanton misconduct.415 In Delaware,
punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter.4 56 The Supreme
Court of Delaware has reiterated that punitive damages are not to be
awarded to correct private wrongs, but only to advance broad societal
purposes.457 Punitive damages are administered under strict judicial
controls to assure that they will be awarded only in instances of the
most egregious misconduct.
458
451. See Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 435, 437 (Conn. 1992); DeSantis
v. Piccadilly Land Corp., 487 A.2d 1110, 1113 (1985) (stating that the purpose
of punitive damages is for compensation).
452. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1999).
453. Id.
454. See Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 529 (Del. 1987).
455. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (1999).
456. Jardel Co., 523 A.2d at 529.
457. Id.
458. Id.
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B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Bifurcation
A Delaware statute requires that the punitive damages
determination in medical malpractice cases be bifurcated. 45 9 Courts
have permitted bifurcation in other substantive areas where punitive
damages are at issue.46°
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damage
"[M]aliciousness, wantonness, gross fraud, recklessness and
willful disregard of another's rights" are the predicates for punitive
damages in the District of Columbia. 46 Punitive damages are awarded
in the district to punish and deter "outrageous conduct.
462
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
In 1995, a D.C. court ruled that punitive damages must be proven
by "clear and convincing evidence.
' ' 63
459. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6855 (1999).
460. See, e.g., Harvey v. Rinehart, C.A. No. 98C-04-007, 1999 Del. Super.
LEXIS 462 (1999) (permitting bifurcation of a personal injury action).
461. Bay Gen. Indus., Inc. v. Johnson, 418 A.2d 1050 (D.C. 1980) (quoting
Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Price, 359 A.2d 25 (D.C. 1976)).
462. Salus Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 478 A.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. 1984).
463. Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 938 (D.C. 1995)
(ruling that, in D.C., plaintiffs must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant's tort was aggravated by egregious conduct and that the
defendant's state of mind warranted punitive damages); see generally Scott L.
Winkelman, Resetting the Punitive Hurdle, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1995, at 43
(reporting that the District of Columbia now mandates the "clear and convincing"
standard for punitive damages award). For cases applying the clear and
convincing evidence standard, see Railan v. Katyal, 766 A.2d 998 (D.C. 2001);
Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P'ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714 (D.C. 2003); Chatman v.
Lawlor, 831 A.2d 395 (D.C. 2003).
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FLORIDA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The Florida standard for punitive liability is negligence of a gross
and flagrant character amounting to criminal manslaughter.464 The
standard for Florida punitive damages is "willful, wanton, or gross
misconduct.' 465  Punitive damages are available even when
compensatory damages are not awarded.466 Florida punitive damages
are imposed for purposes of punishment, specific deterrence, and
general deterrence.
467
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Pleading and Discovery Limitations
No claim for punitive damages can be made unless there is a
"reasonable showing" of evidence supporting the claim. 468 For this
reason, Florida does not permit a plaintiff to initially assert a punitive
damages claim.469 The plaintiff "may move to amend his or her
complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages" once she has met
the evidentiary burden, however.47 °
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence
In civil actions, "the plaintiff must establish at trial, by clear and
convincing evidence, its entitlement to an award of punitive
damages. The 'greater weight of the evidence' burden of proof
applies to a determination of the amount of damages."
471
464. See White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 1984).
465. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(2) (West Supp. 2004).
466. Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1989).
467. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson, 428 So. 2d 243, 246-47 (Fla. 1983).
468. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(1) (West Supp. 2004).
469. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106 (Fla. App. 1994)
(interpreting Florida's punitive damages statute).
470. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72(1) (West Supp. 2004); Kraft, 635 So. 2d at
109.
471. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.725 (West Supp. 2004).
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3. Caps on Punitive Damages
For causes of action arising after October 1, 1999, an award of
punitive damages generally may not exceed the greater of three times
the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each claimant, or
$500,000.472 The statutory limitation is subject to exceptions, such
as when the defendant has specific intent to injure the plaintiff.
473
4. Bifurcation
Defense counsel may request bifurcation of the punitive damages
and compensatory damages phases.474
5. Multiple Damages
In subsequent civil actions involving the same act or single
course of conduct for which punitive damages have already been
awarded, if the court determines by clear and convincing evidence
that the amount of prior punitive damages awarded was insufficient
to punish the defendant's behavior, the court may permit a jury to
consider a second award of punitive damages.
475
6. Restrictions on Evidence of Wealth
The defendant's wealth is a relevant concern in punitive damages
litigation.476 Net worth is admissible in determining the amount of
Florida punitive damages.477 A plaintiff may not, however, discover
the defendant's financial worth or wealth until the trial court has
granted the plaintiff's motion to amend.478
472. Id. § 768.73(1)(a).
473. Id. § 768.73(1)(c).
474. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 506 (Fla. 1994) (creating a
new procedure in Florida to supplement the statutory punitive damage limitations
by requiring courts to "bifurcate the determination of... punitive damages" upon
timely motion). See also Santa Lucia, supra note 60, at 41 ("Bifurcation will
effectively preclude plaintiffs from presenting financial worth evidence in the first.
stage of the trial in which the jury would determine only liability for
compensatory and punitive damages, and the amount of the compensatory
damages.... Bifurcation assists defendants by allowing the argument of
mitigation to be presented in the second portion of the trial.").
475. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2004).
476. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson, 428 So. 2d 243, 246 (Fla. 1983).
477. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985).
478. Meadowbrook Health Care Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Acosta, 617 So. 2d 1104
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7. Repealed Split Recovery Statute
Florida had a statute that allocated 35% of every punitive damages
award to either the State's General Revenue Fund or its Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund.479 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the state-
480sharing scheme in Gordon v. State. In 1992, however, Florida
repealed the statute.
481
GEORGIA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In Georgia, punitive damages may not be awarded for the purpose
of compensation.482 The term "punitive damages" is synonymous with
the terms "vindictive damages," "exemplary damages" and other
damages awarded for "aggravating circumstances to penalize, punish
or deter.' 83  Punitive damages are imposed for actions that
demonstrate "willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness,
oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences.'' 84 In
Georgia, the remedy of punitive damages is not awarded as
compensation, "but solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant.
' 85
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Bifurcation
In all cases in which punitive damages are claimed, liability for
punitive damages is determined first, and then the amount of punitive
damages. 486  If punitive damages are to be awarded, the trial is
recommenced to "receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
479. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b),(4) (West 1997), repealed by, 1992 Fla.
Laws c. 92-85, § 3.
480. 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992).
481. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b),(4) (West 1997), repealed by, 1992 Fla.
Laws c. 92-85, § 3.
482. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(c) (West 2003).
483. Id. § 51-12.5.1(a).
484. Id. § 51-12-5.1(b).
485. Id. § 51-12-5.1(c).
486. Id. § 51-12-5.1(d).
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regarding what amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize,
or punish the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case. ' '487 In
the first phase of a bifurcated trial, the factfinder determines
compensatory damages and whether to award punitive damages.488 In
the second phase, the amount of punitive damages is determined.489
Evidence of the defendant's wealth and other aggravating
circumstances are admissible in the second phase of the trial.49 °
2. Multiple Punishments
Georgia prohibits multiple awards stemming from the same
predicate conduct in products liability actions.
491
3. Caps on Punitive Damages
There is a $250,000 cap on punitive damages in all tort actions not
arising out of intentional torts or products liability actions.492 In a tort
action predicated upon the defendant's "specific intent to cause harm,"
or action taken "under the influence of alcohol, drugs other than
lawfully prescribed drugs," there is no limit on punitive damages.
493
4. Clear and Convincing Evidence
The standard of proof for Georgia punitive damages is clear and
convincing evidence.
494
487. Id. § 51-12-5.1(d)(l)-(2) ("In any case in which punitive damages are
claimed, the trier of fact shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial
whether an award of punitive damages shall be made .... If it is found that
punitive damages are to be awarded, the trial shall immediately be recommenced
in order to receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision regarding what
amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in
light of the circumstances of the case. It shall then be the duty of the trier of fact
to set the amount to be awarded...
488. Id.
489. Id.
490. See id. § 51-12-5.1(d)(2).
491. Id. § 51-12-5.1(e)(1).
492. Id. § 51-12-5.1(g) ($250,000 limitation on punitive damages in all tort
actions not involving products liability or intentional torts).
493. Id. § 51-12-5.1 (f).
494. Id. § 51-12-5.1(b).
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5. Special Verdict
A special verdict must set out a required finding of punitive
damages.495
6. State Sharing of Punitive Damages
Seventy-five percent of a punitive damages award in a products
liability action goes to the state.496 State extraction does not take place
until costs and attorney's fees are paid.497 After these costs have been
extracted, the plaintiff must remit seventy-five percent of her award to
the Georgia Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services.498  Georgia's
punitive damages extraction statute was held constitutional in Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle.4 99
7. Prejudgment Interest Reform
Georgia's tort reform includes a provision for not including
punitive or exemplary damages in the computation of interest prior to
judgment.
500
HAWAII
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
"Under Hawaiian law, punitive damages are recoverable where
the defendant has acted with such an entire want of care as would raise
a presumption of conscious indifference to consequences. 'C'5° Punitive
damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake or errors of
judgment. A plaintiff must prove entitlement to punitive damages by
clear and convincing evidence. 502 Punitive damages predicates are
wanton or oppressive conduct as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations; or misconduct that raises presumption
495. Id. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1).
496. Id. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2).
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
500. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-30 (West 2003).
501. Marquardt v. United Airlines Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Haw.
1992).
502. Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 574 (Haw. 1989).
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of conscious indifference to consequences. °3 The purpose of punitive
damage awards are to penalize, punish or deter a defendant. Punitive
damages may not be used to compensate the plaintiff.
50 4
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. "Clear and Convincing Evidence"
In 1989, the Hawaii Supreme Court raised the standard of proof
in punitive damages cases from a "preponderance of the evidence" to
"clear and convincing evidence. ' 5° 5 "Punitive damages are a form of
punishment and can stigmatize the defendant in much the same way
as a criminal conviction. It is because of the penal character of
punitive damages that a standard of proof more akin to that required
in criminal trials is appropriate.
'" 50 6
IDAHO
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The standard for recovering punitive damages in Idaho is evidence
that a defendant evinces conduct that is an extreme deviation from
reasonable standards of conduct.50 7  The predicates for punitive
damages are oppressive, fraudulent, malicious, or outrageous conduct
by the party against whom the claim for punitive damages is
asserted. 0 8 The deterrence of other similarly situated defendants in the
future may be taken into account in determining the size of punitive
damage awards.
50 9
503. Id. at 573.
504. Id.
505. Id. at 574.
506. Id. at 575.
507. Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661 (Idaho 1983).
508. IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(1) (Michie 2004).
509. Hatrock v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1984)
(applying Idaho law).
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B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
"In any action seeking recovery of punitive damages, the claimant
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent,
malicious, or outrageous conduct by the party against whom the claim
for punitive damages is asserted.'
5 10
2. Pleading Restrictions
Punitive damages may not be pleaded in an initial complaint but
may be included in an amended pleading after a hearing before the
court.
5 1 1
3. Compliance with Industry Standard as a Defense
Idaho permits defendants to interpose a products liability defense
that they complied with industry or feasible performance standards.
512
4. Capped Punitive Damages
Punitive damages in Idaho are limited to the greater of $250,000
or three times compensatory damages.
51 3
ILLINOIS
5 14
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are disfavored in Illinois law,515 although this
remedy has a long lineage. To recover punitive damages in Illinois,
510. IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(1) (Michie 2004).
511. Id. § 6-1604(2).
512. Id. § 6-1306.
513. Id. § 6-1604(3).
514. As of the time of the writing of this article, the status of the Illinois
provisions on punitive damages is uncertain, due to the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). The
court, in Best, declared unconstitutional the entirety of the tort reform enacted by
Public Act 89-7 (1995), including the provisions governing punitive damages. Id.
at 1104. The Illinois courts have generally reverted to law as it existed prior to
the 1995 revision. See, e.g., McCann v. Presswood, 721 N.E.2d 811, 815 (111.
App. Ct. 1999).
515. Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., 563 N.E.2d 397,401 (111. 1990).
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"a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's conduct was with evil motive or with a reckless and
outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and
with a conscious indifference to the rights and safety of others."
516
Punitive damages are recoverable in Illinois to punish and deter, but
not to compensate the plaintiff.517
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Pleading Restrictions
No complaint based upon bodily injury may contain a claim for
punitive damages. The procedure is for the plaintiff to move for a
pretrial hearing seeking leave to amend the complaint to include a
punitive damages claim. 518 Punitive damages may not be added to a
complaint after 30 days from the close of discovery.
519
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence
To recover punitive damages, the Illinois plaintiff "must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's conduct was
with evil motive or with a reckless and outrageous indifference to a
highly unreasonable risk of harm and with a conscious indifference
to the rights and safety of others."
520
516. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05(b) (West 2003) (struck down,
by Best, as part of an unconstitutional scheme). Because this statute largely
codified pre-existing law, see, e.g., Loitz, 563 N.E.2d at 402, the substance of
this provision likely remains in effect.
517. Burgess v. Clairol, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1278, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Stojkovich v. Monadnock Bldg., 666 N.E.2d 704, 711 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (noting
that punitive damages are not for compensation but for punishment and general as
well as specific deterrence).
518. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604.1 (West 2003) (struck down by
Best) (defining method of pleading of punitive damages). Given that the
wording of the repealed statutory provision is almost identical to its
predecessor, this provision is not substantially affected by Best. McCann, 721
N.E.2d at 815.
519. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-604.1 (West 2003).
520. Id. 5/2-1115.05(b) (struck down by Best) (defining clear and convincing
evidence requirement as well as standard for punitive liability).
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3. Restrictions on Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases
In a product liability action, punitive damages are not awarded
against a defendant manufacturer, or product seller, or reseller if the
defendant's conduct that allegedly caused the harm was approved
by, or was in compliance with, standards set forth in applicable
federal or State statute or regulations.
4. No Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice
Punitive damages are not recoverable in medical malpractice
and legal malpractice cases.
521
5. Bifurcation of Punitive Damages Proceeding
At the defendant's request, punitive damages are bifurcated
from the compensatory damages phase of a trial. In the punitive
damages phase, evidence relevant to punishment and deterrence is
introduced. "If the trier of fact makes an award of actual damages,
the same trier of fact shall immediately hear any additional evidence
relevant to, and render a verdict upon, the defendant's liability for
punitive damages and the amount thereof.,
522
6. State Sharing of Punitive Damages at the
Discretion of the Court
Illinois permits a trial court to "apportion the punitive damage
award among the plaintiff, the plaintiffs attorney and the State of
Illinois Department of Human Services. The amount of the award paid
from the punitive damages to the plaintiff's attorney shall be
reasonable and without regard to the contingency fee contract."
523
INDIANA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are imposed if the defendants "subjected other
persons to probable injury, with an awareness of such impending
521. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.
522. Id. 5/2-1115.05 (struck down by Best) (describing method of
bifurcation).
523. Id. 5/2-1207.
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danger and with heedless indifference of the consequences." 524
Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter.
52 5
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
The plaintiff must demonstrate all facts necessary for a punitive
damages award by "clear and convincing evidence."
52 6
2. Capping of Punitive Damages
In 1995, Indiana passed extensive limitations on punitive
damages. As of July 1, 1995, plaintiffs may recover $50,000 or three
times compensatory damages, whichever is greater.
52 7
3. State Sharing of Punitive Damages
Indiana passed a state-sharing scheme in which 75% of each
punitive damages award is allocated to a state fund for victims of
violent crime.528 The payment of punitive damages is made to the
clerk of the court, who pays the plaintiff 25% of each award.529 TheIndiana Supreme Court upheld Indiana's split-recovery statute.530
IOWA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The standard for awarding punitive damages is a "prepon-
derance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence [that] the
conduct of the defendant from which the claim arose constituted
willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another."53'
Iowa follows the majority rule in imposing punitive damages to punish
524. Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 136 (Ind.
1988).
525. Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 113 N.E. 1019, 1020 (id. Ct.
App. 1916).
526. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-2 (Michie 1998).
527. Id. § 34-51-3-4 (describing cap on punitive damages).
528. Id. § 34-51-3-6 (allocating seventy-five percent of every punitive
damages award to state fund benefiting the victims of violent crime).
529. Id. § 34-51-3-6(b)(1)-(2).
530. Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 477 (Ind. 2003).
531. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a) (West 1998).
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and deter.
532
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Iowa requires plaintiffs to prove punitive damages by "clear and
convincing" evidence.
533
2. State Sharing
Only 25% of the punitive damages award is paid to the plaintiff.
The other 75% is placed in a civil reparations trust fund.534
3. Limitations on Pleading and Discovery
The mere pleading of a claim for punitive damages is no basis
for discovering the wealth of the defendant. A plaintiff must
demonstrate a prima facie claim for punitive damages before he or
she can begin discovery of the defendant's ability to pay.
KANSAS
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The standard for Kansas punitive damages is "willful conduct,
wanton conduct, fraud or malice." 535 Punitive damages in Kansas are
awarded to punish and deter the defendant and others from
committing similar acts.
536
B. Limitations on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
The jury determines liability for punitive damages by clear and
convincing evidence. 537 The judge then determines the amount of
532. Webner v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 837 (8th Cir. 2001)
(applying Iowa law).
533. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1)(a) (West 1998).
534. Id. § 668A.l(2)(b).
535. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(c) (1994).
536. Watkins v. Layton, 324 P.2d 130, 134 (Kan. 1958).
537. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(a), (c) (1994).
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punitive damages.
538
2. Judge-Assessed Punitive Damages
In non-medical liability cases, punitive damages are determined
by the court in a bifurcated proceeding. The statute lists a number of
factors that the court should consider, including, the likelihood of
harm, the defendant's awareness, the duration of the misconduct, the
attitude of the defendant upon discovery, and the defendant's
financial condition. 539  In addition, the court considers the total
deterrent effect of other punitive damages or other punishment
imposed upon the defendant.
540
3. Capped Damages
The Kansas cap is the lesser of the defendant's annual gross
income or $5 million.541 In the alternative, if the court believes that
the profitability of the defendant's misconduct will exceed this
amount, the limitation is "1-1/2 times the amount of profit which the
defendant gained or is expected to gain as a result of the defendant's
misconduct."
542
4. Bifurcation
Kansas requires the bifurcation of the amount of punitive damages
and the other aspects of a case. 54 3 Punitive damages must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.544 The judge, rather than the jury,
determines the amount of punitive damages.
545
5. Multiple Punishments
Kansas' judge-assessed punitive damages procedure requires
consideration of the total deterrent effect of other punitive awards
when awarding damages.
546
538. Id. §60-3702(c).
539. Id. § 60-3702(b).
540. Id. § 60-3702(b)(7).
541. Id. § 60-3702(e)(1)--(2).
542. Id. § 60-3702(f).
543. Id. § 60-3702(a).
544. Id. § 60-3702(c).
545. Id. § 60-3702(a)-(b).
546. Id. § 60-3702(b)(7).
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KENTUCKY
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Kentucky awards punitive damages "in enhancement of
compensatory damages on account of the wanton, malicious or reckless
character of the acts complained of. ' 547 "A plaintiff shall recover
punitive damages only upon proving, by clear and convincing
evidence, that the defendant from whom such damages are sought
acted toward the plaintiff with oppression, fraud or malice."
548
Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter the defendant and
others.
549
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Plaintiffs may recover punitive damages if there is proof "by clear
and convincing evidence, that the defendant from whom such damages
are sought acted toward the plaintiff with oppression, fraud or
malice."
550
2. Statutorily Set Standard for Punitive Liability
Kentucky sets the standard for punitive liability statutorily.
551
3. Judge-Assessed Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases
Kentucky imposes judge-assessed punitive damages in products
liability litigation. The court determines the size of the punitive
damages award in a product liability action after the trier of fact
determines fault. 52
547. Great At. Tea Co. v. Smith, 136 S..W.2d 759, 768 (Ky. 1939).
548. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Michie 1992).
549. Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 195 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ky. 1946).
550. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Michie 1992); see also id.
§ 411.184(1 )(a)-(c) (defining "oppression," ".fraud" and "malice").
551. Id. §411.184.
552. Id. § 411.182.
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LOUISIANA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Absent express statutory authorization, punitive damages are not
recognized in Louisiana.
553
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
Not applicable.
MAINE
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are awarded to deter the defendant and others
from repeating the wrongful act. The remedy is permitted in tort
where there is express or implied malice on the part of the
defendant.
554
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Maine permits punitive damages to be awarded if supported by
"clear and convincing" evidence.555
MARYLAND
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Maryland requires a showing of actual malice for the jury to
consider awarding punitive damages in tort cases. The plaintiffs
burden is to establish that the defendant's conduct was characterized by
cc... evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or fraud, i.e., actual malice."556
553. Fairley v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 689 So. 2d 736, 737 (La.
Ct. App. 1997). The exceptions include: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4
(West 1997) (bodily injury caused by drunk drivers); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15:1312(A)(3) (West 1992) (unlawful interception of wire/oral
communications); id. 51:2613(E) (West 2003) (violation of Open Housing
Act).
554. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363-64 (Me. 1985).
555. Id.
556. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
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Punitive damages, as in the majority of states, are intended to punish
and deter.
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Maryland's highest court imposed a clear and convincing standard
of proof to ensure that punitive damages are properly awarded. The
court reasoned that:
[the] potential consequences of a punitive damages claim
warrant a requirement that the plaintiff present proof greater
than a mere preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, we
hold that a plaintiff may recover exemplary damages based
upon tortious conduct. only if he can prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant acted with
malice.
557
2. Limitations on Pleading
Evidence of the defendant's financial means is not admissible
until there has been a finding of liability and that punitive damages
are supportable under the facts.
558
MASSACHUSETTS
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not recoverable in Massachusetts in the
absence of specific statutory provisions.5 5
9
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
Not applicable.
557. Id. at 657.
558. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (2002).
559. Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir. 1968) (dictum);
Santana v. Registrar of Voters, 502 N.E.2d 132 (Mass. 1986).
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MICHIGAN
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The standard for punitive damages is malicious conduct or
conduct so willful and wanton as to demonstrate reckless disregard for
the rights of others.560 The Michigan court also noted Michigan's
long-standing judicial doctrine that exemplary damages play a strictly
compensatory function and may not awarded to punish or deter. The
court reaffirmed the principle that exemplary or punitive damages are
intended only to compensate. 561 "The conduct must be malicious or so
willful and wanton as to demonstrate a reckless disregard of plaintiffs
rights. 5 62  Michigan awards punitive damages to compensate the
plaintiff for humiliation, outrage, and indignity stemming from the
commission of torts. Punitive damages in Michigan compensate the
plaintiff for injured feelings. 563 Compensation is for the humiliation of
being victimized by defendant.
564
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
In Michigan, punitive damages are limited to compensation for
injury to feelings.565 There is no provision for punitive damages to
punish and deter and any award based upon those functions must be
vacated.
MINNESOTA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
"Punitive damages [are] allowed in civil actions only upon clear
and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show
deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others."
566
560. Bailey v. Graves, 309 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1981).
561. Id. at 168.
562. Janda v. City of Detroit, 437 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
563. Joba Constr. Co. v. Bums & Roe, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 760, 773 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
564. Veselenak v. Smith, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264-65 (Mich. 1982).
565. Jackson Printing Co. v. Mitan, 425 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988).
566. MYNN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1)(a) (West 2000).
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B. Limitations on Punitive Damages
1. Pleading Restrictions
Minnesota plaintiffs may not plead punitive damages in their
original complaints. 567  Minnesota requires the plaintiff to present
affidavits showing that the defendant's conduct warrants punitive
damages. If the trial judge finds sufficient prima facie evidence,
punitive damages are pleaded by an amended complaint. 568
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Punitive damages in Minnesota must be proved with "clear and
convincing evidence."
569
3. Bifurcation
Minnesota gives a defendant in a punitive damages case the
right to a bifurcated proceeding in which punitive damages are
determined in the second stage of the trial. Minnesota requires the
entire punitive damages claim, liability and the amount of the award
to be determined in the second phase with post-verdict review by the
trial judge.570
4. Restrictions Regarding the Wealth of the Defendant
Evidence of the defendant's wealth is inadmissible until there is a
separate proceeding to determine the amount of punitive damages.571
5. Statutorily Mandated Factors
Minnesota mandates the factors that must be considered for
punitive damages. Minnesota requires that the award be calibrated to
the purpose of punitive damages, including "the seriousness of hazard
to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct," the
"profitability of the misconduct to the defendant," the "duration of the
567. Punitive damages may not be pleaded initially; punitive damages must be
pleaded by an amended complaint. Id. § § 549.191-549.20.
568. Id. § 549.191 (requiring pre-trial hearing to determine if there is sufficient
prima facie evidence for punitive damages to warrant amending plaintiff's
complaint to include a punitive claim).
569. Id. § 549.20(1)(a).
570. Id. § 549.20(4)-(5).
571. Id. § 549.20(4).
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misconduct and any concealment of it," the "degree of the defendant's
awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness," the "attitude and
conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct," the
"number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the
misconduct," the "financial condition of the defendant," and "the total
effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a
result of the misconduct [including other awards]. 572
MISSISSIPPI
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The Mississippi standard for punitive damages and functions
requires proof that the defendant acted with "actual malice, gross
negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard
for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. 5 73  Before
punitive damages can be recovered from the defendant, the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
acted with (1) malice or (2) gross negligence or reckless disregard
for the rights of others.
574
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Mississippi has a "clear and convincing" evidence standard for
awarding punitive damages where the defendant acted with "actual
malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or
reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual
fraud.
575
2. Bifurcation
Mississippi requires bifurcated proceedings in which the amount
of punitive damages is determined in a separate proceeding at the
572. Id. § 549.20(3).
573. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Supp. 2004).
574. Hurst v. S.W. Miss. Legal Servs. Corp., 708 So.2d 1347, 1350 (Miss.
1998).
575. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
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request of either party. 576
3. Statutorily Mandated Factors for Determining the Amount
of Punitive Damages
In all cases of punitive damages, the factfinder must consider
factors such as the defendant's net worth, the nature and
reprehensibility of the wrongdoing, the impact of the conduct on the
plaintiff, the defendant's motivation, the duration of the conduct,
the defendant's attempt to conceal, and other aggravating
circumstances.
577
4. Capping of Punitive Damages
DEFENDANT'S NET WORTH
$0-$50 million
$50 million-$ 100 million
$100 million-$500 million
$500 million-$750 million
$750 million-$1 billion
More than $1 billion
LIMITATION ON SIZE
2% of defendant's net worth
($1 million maximum)
$2.5 million maximum
$3.75 million maximum
$5 million maximum
$15 million maximum
$20 million maximum
578
MISSOURI
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In Missouri, punitive damages are imposed to punish and deter
conduct that is willful, wanton, malicious, or demonstrates reckless
disregard for the acts or consequences. 579
576. Id. § l1-l-65(b)-(d).
577. Id. § 11-1-65(l)(e).
578. Id. § 11-1-65(3)(a) (Supp. 2004).
579. Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1989).
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B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Bifurcation
Missouri requires bifurcated proceedings in which the amount of
punitive damages is determined in a separate proceeding at the
request of either party.580 It is the jury's role to determine whether a
defendant should be liable in the first phase of the trial, and to
determine the amount of punitive damages in the second phase.
58'
If during the first stage of a bifurcated trial the jury
determines that a defendant is liable for punitive damages,
that jury shall determine, in a second stage of trial, the
amount of punitive damages to be awarded against such
defendant. Evidence of such defendant's net worth shall be
admissible during the second stage of such trial.
582
2. Multiple Punitive Damages
Multiple punitive damages are prohibited in products liability
litigation. In addition, the trial judge may reduce punitive damages if
prior awards have been awarded for the same misconduct.
583
3. Split-Recovery Statute
In Missouri, a party receiving a final judgment including
punitive damages is required to remit 50% to Missouri's victims'
compensation fund.
584
4. Multiple Punitive Damages
Missouri has a provision for crediting amounts paid previously
for punitive damages arising out of the same conduct to limit or
preclude punitive damages.
585
580. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.263(1) (West Supp. 2004) (noting that
bifurcation may be requested by either party).
581. Id. § 510.263(2).
582. Id. § 510.263(3).
583. Id. § 510.263(4).
584. Id. § 537.675(2) (West 2000).
585. Missouri statute section 510.263(4) states:
Within the time for filing a motion for new trial, a defendant may file
a post-trial motion requesting the amount awarded by the jury as
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MONTANA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In Montana, punitive damages are predicated upon actual fraud
or malice.586  "A judge or jury may award, in addition to
compensatory damages, punitive damages for the sake of example
and for the purpose of punishing a defendant."
587
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Punitive damages must be premised on clear and convincing
evidence of actual fraud or actual malice. 588
punitive damages be credited by the court with amounts previously
paid by the defendant for punitive damages arising out of the same
conduct on which the imposition of punitive damages is based. At any
hearing, the burden on all issues relating to such a credit shall be on
the defendant and either party may introduce relevant evidence on
such motion. Such a motion shall be determined by the trial court
within the time and according to procedures applicable to motions for
new trial. If the trial court sustains such a motion the trial court shall
credit the jury award of punitive damages by the amount found by the
trial court to have been previously paid by the defendant arising out of
the same conduct and enter judgment accordingly. If the defendant
fails to establish entitlement to a credit under the provisions of this
section, or the trial court finds from the evidence that the defendant's
conduct out of which the prior punitive damages award arose was not
the same conduct on which the imposition of punitive damages is
based in the pending action, or the trial court finds the defendant
unreasonably continued the conduct after acquiring actual knowledge
of the dangerous nature of such conduct, the trial court shall disallow
such credit, or, if the trial court finds that the laws regarding punitive
damages in the state in which the prior award of punitive damages was
entered substantially and materially deviate from the law of the state
of Missouri and that the nature of such deviation provides good cause
for disallowance of the credit based on the public policy of Missouri,
then the trial court may disallow all or any part of the credit provided
by this section.
Id. § 510.263(4) (West Supp. 2004).
586. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (2003).
587. Id. § 27-1-220(1).
588. Id. § 27-1-221.
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2. Bifurcation
Punitive damages are determined in a bifurcated proceeding and
a judge or jury must decide the issue of punitive liability as well as
the amount.
589
3. Capping of Punitive Damages
An award for punitive damages in Montana "may not exceed
$10 million or 3% of a defendant's net worth, whichever is less" and
the cap does not limit punitive damages that may be awarded in class
action lawsuits.
590
NEBRASKA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not allowed in Nebraska.
5 9 1
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
Not applicable.
NEVADA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Nevada permits punitive damages for punishment and
deterrence where there is evidence of "oppression, fraud, or
malice."
592
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Nevada permits punitive damages to punish and deter where
there is clear and convincing evidence of "oppression, fraud, or
589. Id. § 27-1-221(6). The prior provision requiring a unanimous jury was
declared unconstitutional in Finstad v. W.R. Grace, 9 P.3d 778 (Mont. 220).
590. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(3).
591. See Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960); Miller v.
Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 464
N.W.2d 769,777 (Neb. 1991).
592. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005 (Michie 2002).
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malice."
593
2.' Bifurcation -
After a jury determines that punitive damages will be awarded,
the jury then determines the amount in a separate proceeding.594 In
Stage I, compensatory damages and punitive damages liability are
decided.595 In Stage II, a proceeding "must be conducted before the
same trier of fact to determine the amount of such damages to be
assessed.
,596
3. Capping of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are capped at three times the compensatory
damages or $300,000, whichever is greater. Nevada's cap does not
apply to products liability, insurer acts of bad faith, toxic torts, or
defamation cases.597
NEW HAMPSHIRE
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In 1986, New Hampshire enacted a statute that abolished
punitive damages.
598
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
Not applicable.
NEW JERSEY
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In New Jersey, punitive damages are recoverable if the
defendant's conduct is found to constitute actual malice or wanton
disregard of others' safety.599
593. Id.
594. Id. 42.005(3).
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id.
42.005(2).
598. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997).
599. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12(a) (West 2000).
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B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and. Convifficing Evidence
New Jersey requires the plaintiff to prove the predicate for
punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.
600
2. Bifurcation
New Jersey requires bifurcation of compensatory and punitive
damages upon the motion of the defendant.
601
3. Food and Drug Administration Defense
New Jersey provides that compliance with FDA-approved
warnings is presumptively adequate. Punitive damages are not
available if the FDA approves pharmaceutical products.
60 2
4. Capping of Punitive Damages
New Jersey caps punitive damages at the greater of five times
the award of compensatory damages or $350,000.603 The cap is
lifted in cases involving hate crimes, discrimination, AIDS testing
disclosure, sexual abuse, or injuries caused by drunk drivers.
NEW MEXICO
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are recoverable upon proof of the defendant's
gross negligence, malice, or other circumstances of aggravation.
60 4
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
None enacted.
600. Id.
601. Id. § 2A:15-5.13(a)-(d).
602. Id. § 2A:58C-5(c).
603. Id. § 2A:15-5.14.
604. Gray v. Esslinger, 130 P.2d 24, 28-29 (N.M. 1942).
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NEW YORK
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
New York punitive damages are for punishment and deterrence
and recoverable if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted with
evil or wrongful motive or reckless indifference equivalent thereof.60 5
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
Not applicable.
NORTH CAROLINA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In North Carolina, a defendant is liable for punitive damages if
he or she is engaged in "fraud, .... malice," or "willful or wanton
conduct." 60 6 Punitive damages are never awarded as compensation;
they are awarded beyond actual damages, as a punishment for the
defendant's intentional wrong.
60 7
"The statutory scheme tracks the common-law standards for
awarding punitive damages by mandating that a plaintiff must prove
certain aggravating factors to be entitled to an award of punitive
damages, those factors being fraud, malice, or willful or wanton
conduct."
60 8
B. Limitations on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
North Carolina requires the plaintiff to prove the predicate for
punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. 60 9
605. Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 61 A.D.2d 491, 495 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978).
606. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-5(a) (2003). Malice is "a sense of personal ill
will toward the claimant that activated or incited the defendant to perform the
act or undertake the conduct that resulted in harm to the claimant." Id. § 11D-
5(5).
607. See id. § 1D-15(a).
608. Id.; Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 594 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. 2004).
609. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(b) (2003).
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2. Bifurcation
The defendant has the right to a bifurcated proceeding and
initiates this procedural protection by a motion.
610
3. Capping of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are limited to the greater of three times
compensatory damages or $250,000.
6 11
NORTH DAKOTA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
A plaintiff in North Dakota must prove that "the defendant has
been guilty by clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or
actual malice."612 Punitive damages in North Dakota are intended to
punish and deter "bad" conduct.613 A finding of actual or presumed
malice is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages in North
Dakota.614 Punitive damages require a finding of "oppression, fraud, or
malice, actual or presumed. 615 The Eighth Circuit also stated that
punitive damages instruction should include "the lesser standard of
reckless disregard.
' 616
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Clear and convincing evidence is required to prove punitive
damages in North Dakota.
617
610. Id. § 1D-30.
611. Id. § 1D-25(b).
612. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003).
613. Id. (oppression, fraud, or actual malice).
614. Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. U.S. Gypsum, 953 F.2d 398, 403-04
(8th Cir. 1992).
615. John Deere Co. v. Mygard Equip., Inc., 225 N.W.2d 80, 95 (N.D. 1974).
616. Hebron Pub.
Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d at 404.
617. Id.
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2. Bifurcation
Either party may request bifurcated proceedings.
61 8
3. Capping of Punitive Damages
North Dakota caps punitive damages at the greater of $350,000
or two times compensatory damages.
619
4. Evidence of the Defendant's Wealth is Inadmissible
Evidence of the defendant's wealth is never admissible in North
Dakota.
620
OHIO
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are recoverable where it is proven the
defendant acted with "malice or aggravated or egregious fraud or that
the defendant as principal or master knowingly authorized,
participated in, or ratified actions or omissions of an agent or servant
that so demonstrate."
62 1
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Ohio requires that punitive damages be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
622
2. FDA Defense
In 1987, Ohio developed an FDA defense to punitive damages
in regulated drugs and medical products cases.
623
3. Judicially Dictated State Sharing of Punitive Damages
Ohio is the only state to have ordered a split recovery of punitive
618. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-11(2) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003).
619. Id. § 32-03.2-11(4).
620. Id. § 32-03.2-11(3).
621. 2004 Ohio Laws 144 (effective Apr. 7, 2005).
622. Id. § 2315.21(C)(2).
623. Id. § 2307.80(C).
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damages between the plaintiff and a public entity. In Dardinger v.
Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,624 the Ohio Supreme Court
allocated two-thirds of a $30 million punitive damages award to state
agencies including Ohio State University.
625
4. Judge-Assessed Punitive Damages
Ohio repealed its provision for exclusively judge-assessed
punitive damages.62 6 The current statute allows the trier of fact,
whether judge or jury, to determine the amount of punitive
damages.
627
OKLAHOMA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages in Oklahoma are awarded to "punish the
wrongdoer for wrongs committed upon society."628 The amount of
punitive damages does not have to be in particular ratio to the amount
of actual damages; instead, the focus is on harm caused to society by
the defendant's wrongful acts. 629 Punitive awards are imposed "for the
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant...."630
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
In Oklahoma, punitive damages must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.631
624. 781 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio 2002).
625. Id. at 146.
626. The history accompanying the most recent edition of OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2315.21 (Anderson 2001), states: "Section 2315.21 of the Revised
Code is revived, supersedes the version of the same section that is repealed by
Section 2.02 of [Ohio Senate Bill 108], and includes amendments to respond to
[this provision] being declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of
Ohio." The case in which this provision was declared unconstitutional is
Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994).
627. 2004 Ohio Laws 144 (effective Apr. 7,2005).
628. Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1115 (Okla. 1991).
629. Id.
630. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West Supp. 2005).
631. Id. § 9.1(B) (Supp. 2005).
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2. Bifurcation
Oklahoma requires a, bifurcated proceeding to determine the
amount of punitive damages.632
3. Capped Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are capped in three separate categories of
cases based upon the defendant's state of mind. In cases where the
defendant is proven reckless, punitive damages are limited to
$100,000 or the level of compensatory damages, whichever is
greater. For the second category, where the jury finds clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has acted intentionally and
with malice, or an insurer has intentionally or maliciously breached
its duty of good faith and fair dealing, punitive damages can be no
larger than two times compensatory damages or $500,000. In the
third category, if the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant has acted intentionally and with malice toward others,
there is no cap.
633
OREGON
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages in Oregon are recoverable where the
defendant "acted with malice or has shown a reckless and outrageous
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with
a conscious indifference to the health, safety and welfare of
others."
63 4
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Oregon punitive damages are proven by the clear and
convincing evidence standard.635
632. Id. § 9.1(B)(2), (C)(2), (D)(2).
633. Id. § 9.1(B)-(D).
634. OR. REv. STAT. § 31.730 (2003).
635. Id.
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2. FDA Defense
Punitive damages may not be assessed against pharmaceutical
manufacturers if the drug was manufactured or labeled in conformity
with the Federal Food and Drug Administration regulations, or is
generally recognized as safe and effective pursuant to FDA
regulation.
636
PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania punitive damages may be "awarded for conduct
that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others."
637
RHODE ISLAND
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In Rhode Island, punitive damages are awarded for the purposes of
punishment, specific deterrence, and general deterrence, and the
predicate is that the defendant's conduct was willful, reckless, or
wicked.638
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
None enacted.
SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
South Carolina permits a jury to award punitive damages to
punish, deter, and vindicate the rights of a plaintiff whenever conduct
of the defendant is willful, wanton, or reckless.
639
636. Id. § 30.927(1)(a)-(b).
637. Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985).
638. Greater Providence Deposit Corp. v. Jenison, 485 A.2d 1242, 1244 (R.I.
1984).
639. Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.3d 95, 110 (4th Cir. 1991).
Spring 2005] 1411
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:1297
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
South Carolina's tort reform statute requires "clear and
convincing" evidence for punitive damages to be awarded.6 41 Case
law further defined this standard as "consciousness of the
wrongdoing" at the time of the conduct.
64 1
SOUTH DAKOTA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
South Dakota punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter
"willful, wanton or malicious" conduct.642 Punitive damages may be
predicated upon oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, or in
any case of wrongful injury to animals, being subjects of property,
committed intentionally or by willful and wanton misconduct, in
disregard of humanity.,
64 3
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
A 1986 tort reform raised the standard of proof from a
preponderance of the evidence to "clear and convincing evidence."
644
2. Restrictions on Pleading and Discovery
"In any claim alleging punitive or exemplary damages, before any
discovery relating thereto may be commenced and before any such
claim may be submitted to the finder of fact, the court shall find, after a
hearing and based on clear and convincing evidence, that there is a
reasonable basis to believe that there has been willful, wanton or
malicious conduct on the part of the party claimed against."
645
640. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law Co-op Supp. 2003).
641. Mattison, 947 F.3d at 110.
642. Flockhart v. Wyant, 467 N.W.2d 473, 477 (S.D. 1991).
643. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-2 (Michie 1987).
644. Id. § 21-1-4.1 (Michie 1987).
645. Id.
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TENNESSEE
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In Tennessee punitive damages may be recovered where the
defendant intentionally, fraudulently, maliciously or recklessly harmed
the plaintiff.646
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
Punitive damages require clear and convincing evidence.
647
TEXAS
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The standards for recovery of exemplary damages in Texas are (1)
fraud, (2) malice, or (3) gross negligence.
648
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Plaintiffs must prove punitive damages by clear and convincing
evidence.
649
2. Bifurcation
Bifurcation is required in Texas after Transportation Insurance
Co. v. Moriel.650 Texas bifurcates to isolate evidence that is relevant
only to the amount of punitive damages, such as the net worth of the
defendant.
3. Capping of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are capped at the greater of (a) two times
compensatory damages plus an amount equal to non-economic
646. Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992).
647. Id.
648. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (a)(1)-(3) (Vernon Supp.
2004-2005).
649. Id. § 41.003.
650. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
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damages not to exceed $750,000, or (b) $200,000.65'
UTAH
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are designed to punish and deter defendants
for "knowing and reckless" conduct. The standard of liability is
based on "clear and convincing" evidence.
652
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
Punitive damages must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
653
2. Bifurcation
Evidence of the defendant's wealth can only be introduced after
a finding of liability for punitive damages.
654
3. FDA Defense
There is a government standards defense to punitive damages
for FDA approved drugs.
655
4. State Sharing of Punitive Damages
Utah apportions punitive damages in excess of $20,000 equally
between the plaintiff and Utah's General Fund.656 Recently, a Utah
district court judge declared that Utah's split recovery statute was an
unconstitutional taking.
657
651. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (Vernon Supp. 2004-
2005).
652. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (Supp. 2004).
653. Id.
654. Id.
655. Id. § 78-18-2.
656. Id. § 78-18-1 (apportioning half of any amount in excess of $20,000
punitive damages to half).
657. Thomson, supra note 313.
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VERMONT
A. Standard of Liability and Functions ofPunitive Damages
Vermont plaintiffs must prove that the plaintiff acted with "actual
malice" in the form of "reckless or wanton disregard" of another's
rights.658 Punitive damages are for punishment and deterrence of
conduct that was emblematic of a "bad spirit and wrong intention."
65 9
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
None enacted.
VIRGINIA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In Virginia punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter
where there is actual malice, misconduct, or such recklessness or
negligence as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others.
660
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Capping of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are capped at $350,000, with no exceptions.
66'
WASHINGTON
Washington common law does not allow punitive damages.
662
WEST VIRGINIA
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter gross fraud,
malice, oppression, or wanton, willful or reckless conduct, or criminal
658. Shortle v. Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 399 A.2d 517, 518 (Vt. 1979).
659. Parker v. Hoefer, 100 A.2d 434, 446 (Vt. 1953).
660. Oxenham v. Johnson, 402 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Va. 1991); Booth v. Robertson,
374 S.E.2d 1, 2 (Va. 1988).
661. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 2000) (caps punitive damages at
$350,000).
662. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1075 (Wash. 1891).
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indifference to civil obligations affecting the rights of others.
663
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
None enacted.
WISCONSIN
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
The 1995 tort reform fortifies the standard for punitive damages.
The new standard is proof "that the defendant acted maliciously toward
the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the
plaintiff.,
664
B. Limits on Punitive Damages
1. Clear and Convincing Evidence
In 1980, the Wisconsin Supreme Court articulated the earlier
standard for punitive liability in Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.6 65 The
Wangen court required that the plaintiff establish that a defendant was
malicious or reckless by "clear and convincing evidence."
666
2. Statutorily Defined Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are now defined by statute as appropriate
where the defendants acted "maliciously or in intentional disregard
of the rights of the plaintiff.
WYOMING
A. Standard of Liability and Functions of Punitive Damages
In Wyoming, the purpose of punitive damages is to punish or deter
the defendant for willful or wanton conduct.
6 67
663. Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 877 (W. Va. 1982).
664. Id.
665. 294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (Wis. 1980).
666. Id. at 458.
667. Bell v. Mickelsen, 710 F.2d 611, 619 (10th Cir. 1983).
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B. Limits on Punitive Damages
None enacted.
TORT REFORMS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STATES
STATES NONE CAPS PROOF STATE
SHARING
ALA. 1987 1987
ALASKA 1997 1986 1997
ARK 2003 2003
ARIZ. 1986
CALIF. 1987 2004
COLO. 1986 1972
CONN. 1979
DEL.
D.C. 1995
1986-
FLA. 1999 1997 19951995
GA. 1987 1987 1987
Hi. 1989*
ID. 2003 2003
ILL. 1986
IND. 1995 1982 1995
IA. 1987 1986
KANS. 1988 1987
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STATES NONE CAPS PROOF STATE
SHARING
KY. 1988
LA. X N/A N/A N/A
MD. 1992
MAINE 1985
MASS. X N/A N/A N/A
Comp.
MICH. Function N/A N/A N/A
Only
MINN. 1978
MIss. 2004 1993
Mo. 1997* 1987
MONT. 2003 1987
NEB. X N/A N/A N/A
NEV. 1989 1989
N.H. 1986 N/A N/A N/A
N.J. 1995 1995
N.M.
N.Y.
N.C. 1995 1995
N.D. 1987 1993
OHIO 2005 1987 2002
OKLA. 1995 1986
ORE. 1995 1995
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STATES NONE CAPS PROOF STATE
SHARING
PA.
R.I.
S.C. 1988
S.D. 1986
Tx. 1995 1995
1992*
TENN.
UTAH 1989
VA. 1987
VT.
WASH. X N/A N/A
W.VA.
Wisc. 1980*
Wyo.
* Denotes judicial tort reform or restriction imposed by state court.
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